Silverbeard's Arcadian Chronicles

Obama "Bitter" Comment Non-Issue

2008-04-16T14:55:00.000-07:00

Both McCain and H. Clinton have decided that what makes them win is pushing a statement that Obama is elitist because of a comment he made about blue collar and rural people becoming somewhat "bitter" (I am quoting on that one word because you will hear it over and over from the candidates).

You will also have them run to the importance of religion, implying that Obama isn't really one of you humble religious loving christian blue collar and rural bumpkins that they are actually playing to. "Cynical Politics" as usual by McCain and H. Clinton and their highly paid political advisers. Oh, by the way, you are poorly educated, racist, and white.

They will be trying to drown out the drum beat of "Change" coming from the Obama camp that has been gaining ground in the consciousness of the U.S. American psyche.

What I know is that my 83 year old father and my 74 year old mother, my sister, myself have been Republican supporters and will be voting, hopefully, for Obama -- for good policy, because we read their policy papers on each politicians web site and liked Obama's policies.

The Rise of Progressive Realism in U.S. Politics

2008-02-17T14:21:00.000-08:00

Conservatism, Globalism, Militarism, Police State, Neo-Con, Big Energy, Media Propaganda and Extreme Debt have been the result of right wing conservative policy over the last few decades in American politics.

Currently the race for the presidency after the extremes of President Bush and his great desire to rid the world of evil-doers have put a strong light on the need to move past conservative policy as it has been practiced.

A country weary of fighting other peoples battles for them and understanding the limits of putting one countries resources into policing the world, the United States stands on a fragile economy that effects the global economy.

It is obvious then that "change" would be the winning theme of the presidencial race.

But real change will take real work and the outcome of the election won't matter much because of how greatly weakened the presidency has become under President Bush.

McCain, Obama, and Clinton are now focused on their poll numbers, their policies have mostly been posted. Each with great strengths and weaknesses, but one thing has already changed - Huckabee is the only right wing republican religious conservative - and he wasn't even close to ousting McCain. Why?

The country has been transitioning from the Rush Limbaugh of conservative dogma to seeing what works and what doesn't over the last 20 years or so. Science and logic with a focus on improving the human condition are at the heart of this new political reality, or progressive realism.

The war against terrorist organizations like Al-Quada is still an ongoing concern as is the oil crisis and global warming. The purpose of NATO is in question after the cold war. Complete nuclear disarmament is still a long way from completion. The land management of the US government with respect to native american lands is a travesty of justice and needs completion. The health care of the average US citizen is approaching unaffordability stressing already stretched paychecks. A people becoming traumatised and drug dependent. A policy of "war" on drug addicts with a focus on incarceration instead of rehabilitation and the rise of South American Drug lords has given the US the distinction of have more of its population jailed than any other country in the world.

The two main conditions coming from conservatism is "fear" and "neglect" and a rise of the wealthy class as prime beneficiaries of the government spending spree. The lack of respectful emigration and work permits has been an ongoing concern from the rest of the world and President Bush tried to convince conservatives of his party and in the Congress that a balanced approach would be prudent, without result.

"Conservatism" became "obstructionism" on family values, homosexual marriage, the right to die, stem cell research, women's right to choose, the teaching of evolution in school, and the separation of church and state.

The age of progressive realism in US politics is dawning.

U.S. Government Wants High Speed Mag Lev

2007-12-03T04:33:00.000-08:00

A HIGHLY FAVORABLE STUDY OF THE USE OF MAG LEV CARS AND TRAINS AS THE TOP SOLUTION TO OUR TRANSPORTATION PROBLEMS IN THE UNITED STATES.

Final Report on the National Maglev Initiative

For General Knowledge of Mag Lev Technology CLICK HERE.

-------------------------------------------------------------------

Table of Contents

Preface P-1

Executive Summary ES-1

Chapter 1: Background 1-1

1.1 WHAT IS MAGLEV? 1-1
1.1.1 Suspension Systems 1-1
1.1.2 Propulsion Systems 1-1
1.1.3 Guidance Systems 1-2
1.1.4 Maglev and U.S. Transportation 1-2
1.1.5 Why Maglev? 1-2
1.2 U.S. TRANSPORTATION ENVIRONMENT 1-3
1.3 MAGLEV EVOLUTION 1-6
1.4 THE NATIONAL MAGLEV INITIATIVE (NMI) 1-6
1.5 ISSUES ADDRESSED IN THIS REPORT 1-7

Chapter 2: Assessment of Maglev Technology 2-1
2.1 ANALYSIS PROCESS 2-1
2.1.1 Investigation of Critical Technologies 2-1
2.1.2 Development of U.S. Maglev (USML)
Concepts 2-1
2.1.3 Assessment of Technology 2-2
2.1.4 Cost Estimating 2-2
2.2 OVERVIEW OF SYSTEM CONCEPTS 2-2
2.2.1 Existing HSGT Systems 2-2
2.2.1.1 French Train a Grande Vitesse
(TGV) 2-4
2.2.1.2 German TR07 2-5
2.2.1.3 Japanese High-Speed Maglev 2-7
2.2.2 U.S. Contractors' Maglev Concepts (SCDs) 2-8
2.2.2.1 Bechtel SCD 2-9
2.2.2.2 Foster-Miller SCD 2-10
2.2.2.3 Grumman SCD 2-11
2.2.2.4 Magneplane SCD 2-12
2.3 FINDINGS 2-13
2.3.1 Opportunities for Technology Improvements 2-13
2.3.2 Safety 2-15
2.4 SYNTHESIS OF A U.S. MAGLEV SYSTEM 2-16

Chapter 3: The Potential for Maglev Application in U.S.
Intercity Transportation 3-1
3.1 OVERVIEW 3-1
3.2 ANALYTICAL APPROACH AND METHOD 3-1

iii

Chapter 3: The Potential Maglev Application in U.S.
Intercity Transportation (Cont'd) 3-1
3.2.1 General Approach 3-1
3.2.2 Routes and Scenarios 3-2
3.2.3 Trip Times 3-4
3.2.4 Fares 3-7
3.2.5 Ridership and Revenues Estimation 3-7
3.2.6 Cost Estimation 3-7
3.2.7 Financial Assessment 3-8
3.2.8 Public Benefits 3-9

3.3 ESTIMATES OF MAGLEV RIDERSHIP, REVENUE, AND COSTS 3-9
3.3.1 Corridor Financial Feasibility Results 3-9
3.3.2 Corridor Costs 3-12
3.3.3 Corridor Ridership and Revenues 3-14
3.3.4 Intercorridor Impacts on Financial
Performance 3-18
3.3.5 Effect of Alignment on Financial
Performance 3-20
3.3.6 Financial Potential of Maglev in Other
Corridors 3-21
3.4 PUBLIC BENEFITS OF MAGLEV 3-21
3.4.1 Airport Congestion Relief Benefit 3-21
3.4.2 Impacts on Petroleum Usage, Emissions,
and Safety 3-25
3.5 OTHER NATIONAL IMPACTS OF MAGLEV 3-25
3.5.1 Employment Implications 3-26
3.5.2 Technological Advancement and Spinoffs 3-26
3.5.3 International Competitiveness 3-28

Chapter 4: Comparisons of U.S. Maglev with Existing HSGT
Systems- Transrapid (TRO7) and TGV 4-1
4.1 OVERVIEW 4-1
4.2 ANALYTICAL APPROACH AND METHODS 4-1
4.3 ECONOMIC COMPARISON OF HSGT TECHNOLOGY OPTIONS 4-2
4.3.1 Sources of Economic Differences 4-2
4.3.2 Comparisons of Corridor Financial
Performance 4-5
4.3.3 Public Benefit Comparisons 4-12

Chapter 5: Options For Acquiring Maglev Technology 5-1
5.1 INTRODUCTION 5-1
5.2 DESCRIPTION OF OPTIONS 5-1
5.2.1 Reliance on Existing Foreign Technology 5-1
5.2.2 Improvement on Existing Technology Through
Joint Venture with Foreign Maglev System
Developer 5-2
5.2.3 Development of a USML System 5-3
5.2.3.1 Background 5-3
5.2.3.2 USML Development Program 5-3
5.3 EVALUATION/RATING OF THE THREE MAGLEV OPTIONS 5-4

iv

Chapter 6: Conclusions and Recommendations 6-1
6.1 CONCLUSIONS 6-1
6.1.1 U.S. Industry Can Develop an Advanced
Maglev System 6-1
6.1.2 A USML System Has the Potential for
Revenues to Exceed Life Cycle Costs
in One Corridor, and to Cover Operating
Costs and a Substantial Portion of
Capital Costs in Others 6-2
6.1.3 A USML System Would Provide an
Opportunity to Develop new Technologies
and Industries with Possible Benefits
for U.S. Businesses and the Work Force 6-3
6.1.4 A U.S. Maglev is not Likely to be
Developed Without Significant Federal
Government Investment 6-4
6.2 RECOMMENDATIONS 6-4
6.3 RECOMMENDED PROGRAM 6-5

Appendix A: Additional Information A-1

Appendix B: List of NMI Participants B-1

Bibliography BB-1

Glossary G-1

v

List of Figures

Figure 1.1 The Three Primary Functions Basic to Maglev
Technology 1-1
Figure 1.2 Electromagnetic Maglev 1-2
Figure 1.3 Electrodynamic Maglev 1-2
Figure 2.1 Artist Conception of French Train a Grande
Vitesse HSR System 2-4
Figure 2.2 Artist Conception of the German TR07 Maglev
System 2-5
Figure 2.3 Artist Conception of the Japanese Maglev
System 2-7
Figure 2.4 Artist Conception of the Bechtel SCD Maglev
System 2-9
Figure 2.5 Artist Conception of the Foster-Miller SCD
Maglev System 2-10
Figure 2.6 Artist Conception of the Grumman SCD Maglev
System 2-11
Figure 2.7 Artist Conception of the Magneplane SCD
Maglev System 2-12
Figure 2.8 U.S. Maglev/German TR07 Maximum Available
Acceleration 2-18
Figure 3.1 U.S. Map of Study Corridors 3-2
Figure 3.2 Comparison of Air and Maglev Trip Times by
Distance 3-5
Figure 3.3 Trip Growth Rates for Air and Auto Modes 3-8
Figure 3.4A Estimates of Maglev Revenue-to-Cost Ratios
for Baseline and Favorable Scenarios by
Corridor Using a 7 Percent Discount Rate 3-10
Figure 3.4B Estimates of Maglev Revenue-to-Cost Ratios
for Baseline and Favorable Scenarios by
Corridor Using a 4 Percent Discount Rate 3-11
Figure 3.5 Maglev Lifecycle Cost Distribution, NEC and
NYS Corridors 3-14
Figure 3.6 Intercorridor System Definitions for
Network Analysis 3-19
Figure 4.1 Trip Time By Technology 4-3
Figure 4.2 Passenger-Miles Per Route-Mile Limited
Sharing Alignment-2020 4-5
Figure 4.3 Total Net Financial Assistance-7 Percent
Discount 4-11
Figure 4.4 Net Financial Assistance Per Passenger
Mile @ 7 Percent Discount Rate, Year 2020 4-11
Figure 4.5 Energy Intensity of Intercity
Transportation Modes versus Stage Length 4-13
Figure 6.1 Prototype Development Plan 6-5

vi

List of Tables

Table ES.1 Cost and Performance of Different Systems ES-3
Table 2.1 General Performance Parameters 2-3
Table 2.2 Technology Cost and Performance 2-17
Table 3.1 Corridor Identification for Maglev Analysis 3-3
Table 3.2 Summary of Differing Assumptions under Each
Scenario 3-4
Table 3.3 Comparison of Line Haul and Total Trip Times
by Mode for selected Corridor City Pairs
(Hours) 3-6
Table 3.4 Maglev Initial Capital Costs by Corridor 3-13
Table 3.5 Diversion Rates Summary by Mode 3-15
Table 3.6 Level and Sources of Maglev Revenues by
Corridor, Year 2020 3-16
Table 3.7 Sources of NYS Corridor Passenger Miles 3-17
Table 3.8 Impact of Intercorridor Network Travel on
Revenue/Cost Ratio (R/C) 3-20
Table 3.9 Comparison of Maglev Financial Measures for
Extensive Sharing and Limited Sharing
Alignments 3-22
Table 3.10 Indicators of Maglev Financial Performance
for 26 study Corridors 3-23
Table 3.11 Calculation of Congestion Reduction Benefit
at Selected Airports 3-24
Table 4.1 Fare Level Assumptions by Technology and
Alignment, Percent of Airfare 4-3
Table 4.2 Total Initial Capital Costs Assuming a 7
Percent Discount Rate ($ Billions) 4-4
Table 4.3 Revenue/Cost and Operating Cost Recovery
Ratios over the Life of the Project Assuming
a 7 Percent Discount Rate 4-6
Table 4.4 Revenue/Cost and Operating Cost Recovery
Ratios over the Life of the Project Assuming
a 4 Percent Discount Rate 4-7
Table 4.5 U.S. Maglev Advantage in Revenue Per Route
Mile (2020) over the TR07 and TGV
Technologies by Alignment 4-8
Table 4.6 U.S. Maglev Advantage in Revenue to Cost
Ratio by Alignment 4-8
Table 4.7 Operating Costs, Revenues, and Operating
Deficit/Surplus 2020 ($ Billions) 4-9
Table 4.8 Comparison of Financial Impacts Due to
Intercorridor Effects on the East Coast
Corridor 4-10
Table 4.9 Average Percent Reduction in Intercity
Passenger Emissions Limiter Sharing ROWs,
16 Corridors-2020 4-14
Table 4.10 Total Savings ($ Million) in Intercity
Passenger Emission Costs Limited Sharing
ROWs, 16 Corridors - 2020 4-15

vii

Table 4.11 Estimated Lives Saved as a Result of Diverting
Trips to U.S. Maglev on the Limited Sharing
Alignment 4-15
Table 5.1 Evaluation of Maglev Options 5-5
Table A1 Percentage Diverted from Highway and Air,
by Technology (2020, Limited Sharing
Alignment) A-2
Table A2 Impact of Intercorridor Network Travel on
Revenue/Cost Ratio(R/C) at 4 Percent A-3
Table A3 Trip Times (Hours) and Average Speed (MPH),
by Technology (2020, Limited Sharing
Alignment) A-4
Table A4 Total Initial Capital Costs Assuming a 4
Percent Discount Rate($ Billions) A-5
Table A5 HSGT Person Trips, Passenger Miles, by
Technology (2020, Limited Sharing
Alignment) A-6
Table A6 Estimated 2020 Ticket Price and Financial
Assistance per Rider assuming a 7 Percent
Discount Rate (1991 Dollars) A-7
Table A7 Estimated 2020 Ticket Price and Financial
Assistance per Rider Assuming a 4 Percent
Discount Rate (1991 Dollars) A-8
Table A8 Estimated 2020 Cost per Passenger Mile
Assuming a 7 Percent Discount Rate (Dollars) A-9
Table A9 Estimated 2020 Cost per Passenger Mile
Assuming a 4 Percent
viii

Preface

In June 1990, the Department of Transportation (DOT),
responding to a directive from Congress, submitted a
preliminary report on the technical and economic feasibility
of constructing high-speed, intercity maglev transportation
systems in the United States. At the same time, the U.S. Army
Corps of Engineers (USACE), also in response to Congress,
submitted a preliminary implementation plan for the
development of a U.S. designed maglev system. In its report,
the Department's preliminary conclusion was that some maglev
routes could be built and run at a profit and that public
benefits could justify public sector support on other routes.
Although there was some indication of the opportunity for
significant technological advances, the limited nature of the
study was insufficient to develop recommendations for
initiating a maglev program in the United States. Further
technical and economic investigation was recommended.

In April 1990, the DOT, USACE, the Department of Energy (DOE),
and other agencies formed the National Maglev Initiative (NMI)
to conduct and coordinate further research and evaluation. The
goals of the NMI were to continue the analysis conducted
earlier in evaluating maglev's potential for improving
intercity transportation in the United States and also to
determine the appropriate role for the Federal Government in
advancing this technology. About $26.2 million was spent
through FY 1992 on maglev technology research and economic
analysis. In FY 1993, an additional $9.8 million was
appropriated to complete the NMI and conduct high priority
research. Also, in December 1991, the Intermodal Surface
Transportation Efficiency Act (ISTEA) authorized a $725 million
maglev prototype development program but no funding has been
appropriated for FY 1992 or 1993, pending the results of the
NMI.

The purpose of this report is to recommend future Government
action regarding maglev. The recommendation is based on
private sector and Government information generated during the
past 3 years concerning the viability of maglev as an
intercity transportation alternative for the United States.
The information includes the projected technical and financial
performance of maglev in intercity markets in competition with
other modes of travel, the anticipated external benefits such
as reduction in pollution and congestion in other modes, and
other national-level impacts. The report considers the
potential of a new United States Maglev (USML) system compared
with that of alternatives using existing maglev technology or
high-speed rail (HSR).

The report discusses three options for acquiring maglev
technology for the United States. The first option is to
acquire maglev technology currently being developed in Germany
or Japan. The second option is to undertake advanced maglev
development in partnership with Germany or Japan. The third
option is to invest in an advanced USML development program.
Based on a comparison of the three options, the report
recommends a program that is appropriate to and consistent
with the Federal role in a national transportation strategy.

P-1

Executive Summary

High-speed magnetically levitated ground transportation
(maglev) is a new surface mode of transportation in which
vehicles glide above their guideways, suspended, guided, and
propelled by magnetic forces. Capable of traveling at speeds
of 250 to 300 miles-per-hour or higher, maglev would offer an
attractive and convenient alternative for travelers between
large urban areas for trips of up to 600 miles. It would also
help relieve current and projected air and highway congestion
by substituting for short-haul air trips, thus releasing
capacity for more efficient long-haul service at crowded
airports, and by diverting a portion of highway trips.

Strategic economic goals of job creation, technological
advancement, international competitiveness, and petroleum
conservation would be supported by the development and
building of maglev systems.

Conclusions

This report presents the conclusions and findings of the NMI,
a unique interagency cooperative effort of the Federal
Railroad Administration (FRA) of the DOT, the USACE, and the
DOE, with support from other agencies. The findings are based
on a series of comprehensive studies conducted over a 36-month
period to evaluate the potential for maglev in the future U.S.
transportation system and the role of the Federal Government
in achieving that potential. The principal conclusions of
these studies are:

. U.S. industry can develop an advanced U.S. Maglev (USML)
system.

. A USML system has the potential for revenues to exceed
life cycle costs in one corridor, and to cover operating
costs and a substantial portion of capital costs in
others. The high initial investment will require
substantial public assistance.

. A USML system would provide an opportunity to develop new
technologies and industries with possible benefits for
U.S. businesses and the work force.

. A USML system is not likely to be developed without
significant Federal Government investment.

U.S. Industry Can Develop an Advanced USML System

With an adequately funded program, U.S. industry would have a
high probability of success in developing a U.S.-designed and
built magnetic levitation system with physical performance
capabilities better than those of existing maglev or highspeed
rail (HSR) systems. This conclusion is based on results of
studies of critical technologies under 27 contracts sponsored
by the NMI and on the evaluations and independent analyses of
four system concepts defined under major contracts awarded by
the NMI. Findings from these studies are as follows:

. A U.S. 300-mph maglev system is feasible.

. In locations where land is too costly or unavailable,
following existing rightsof-way (ROW) can be an acceptable

ES-1

option. A USML system can be designed to include tilting
mechanisms and high-powered propulsion systems that would
allow vehicles to follow existing ROW at very high speeds.
Tilt angles up to 30 and turning rates involved in following
existing ROW at high speed will be acceptable to most
travelers.

. There are many cases where following existing ROW would not
be cost-effective. A limited sharing (LS) alignment with
shared use limited to urban areas permits higher operating
speeds, reduced guideway length, and shorter trip times.
Extensive Sharing (ES) ROW alignments tend to be inferior to
the LS alignments in ridership, costs, and overall financial
performance.

. A USML system can be designed so that magnetic fields are
attenuated to normal urban levels without severe weight or
cost penalties.

. A new USML system can be designed with new composite
materials and innovative vehicle components to reduce weight
and energy consumption.

At the same time, promising innovations for further
technological improvement were identified. If proved
effective, they would reduce the cost and improve performance
of a USML system. Most prominent among these potential
innovations are:

. Local commutation or individual control and activation of
each guideway propulsion coil for a linear synchronous motor
(LSM) will lower capital costs while enhancing propulsion
performance.

. Use of the same coil system to transfer auxiliary power from
the guideway onto the vehicle, as a spin-off of the locally
commutated LSM, will reduce on-board battery requirements and
associated vehicle weight.

. Applying the rapid advances in power semiconductor
technology, in which the United States has a lead, will
reduce both capital and operating costs. The savings result
from substantial reductions in size and weight as well as
improved efficiencies of power conditioning equipment for
both vehicle and wayside systems.

. Electronic vehicle switching to replace current movable
mechanical switches in the guideway will result in higher
vehicle speeds and reduced headways, reducing trip time and
increasing system capacity.

Although none of these improvements are considered to "leap
frog" the existing maglev designs, taken together, they
represent a significant opportunity for U.S. industry to
participate in the maglev competition.

Synthesis of the above NMI findings gives rise to what would
be expected in a USML. Table ES.1 below compares a USML
technology that could result from a development program, with
existing highspeed ground transportation (HSGT technologies.
The costs shown on the first 2 rows of Table ES.1 include only
distance-related costs of guideway structure, electric power
supply, propulsion, and control systems. They do not include
vehicle costs, the costs of major facilities, such as stations
and

ES-2

Click HERE for graphic.

Note: (1) Modified Train a Grand Vitesse (TGV) proposed for
the Texas HSR System.
(2) Includes only distance-related technology costs.
(3) German Maglev System.
(4) A construction financing cost is included in these
estimates using the 7 percent discount rate.

maintenance or control centers, land acquisition, site
preparation, earth moving, tunneling or long span bridges,
program management, and contingencies. These factors are,
however, appropriately covered in the economic analysis
described below and in the third row of Table ES.1, which
presents the spread of capital costs per mile for each
technology over the corridors analyzed in the NMI studies.

It should be pointed out that the estimated costs for TGV are
supported by significant operational experience in France and
for TR07, significant test experience in Germany. For USML,
the cost estimates were derived from analytical studies by
system contractor teams and are considered reasonable; yet,
until a U.S. maglev system is built and operated in the United
States, there is uncertainty regarding these estimates.

A USML System Has the Potential for Revenues to Exceed Life
Cycle Costs in One Corridor, and to Cover Operating Costs and a
Substantial Portion of Capital Costs in Others If a USML system
with the characteristics shown in the above table were installed
in the 10 top U.S. corridor markets, its revenues would cover
operating costs, with substantial contribution to capital costs
in all corridors. In the Northeast Corridor, its revenues would
cover total life cycle costs. In the other corridors significant
public investment would be required. These projected results
reflect the ability of the technology to offer the best
door-to-door travel time for distances up to 300 miles and very
competitive trip times even up to 600 miles. They also, however,
reflect the high cost of building such systems, $27 million to
$46 million per mile, including

ES-3

site preparation and other costs that depend on terrain,
degree of urbanization, and other factors.

The detailed economic results depend on the discount rate used
in the calculations. A 7 percent discount rate with constant
dollar prices was used as the baseline rate for this report.
When translated into market terms (where inflation is taken
into account), it would be about 10 to 11 percent. The 7
percent rate is required to be used by the Office of
Management and Budget for making economic decisions regarding
all Federal Government sponsored or assisted projects. It is
intended to reflect the average return to capital investments
in all sectors of the economy and, thus, the social
opportunity cost of using resources for maglev investments.
With a 7 percent rate USML revenues would be slightly higher
than life cycle costs in the Northeast Corridor, but would
cover only about 30 to 50 percent of life cycle costs in the
other nine corridors. Under more favorable assumptions about
future travel growth, congestion, and cost of competing modes,
two of the corridors would cover life cycle costs and the
others would cover about 50 to 80 percent.

A 4 percent discount rate was also used for the same
calculations as a sensitivity analysis. When translated into
market terms, this is representative of the type of financing
that could be available to sponsors of high-speed ground--
transportation projects using tax exempt bonds. In this case,
in the Northeast Corridor, a U.S. Maglev system would produce
a surplus of revenues about 47 percent above life cycle costs.
In the other nine corridors, revenues would cover about 50 to
80 percent of the life cycle costs. Under the more favorable
assumptions, six corridors would cover total costs, with the
other three covering about 75 percent.

Generally, revenue-to-cost ratios would be higher for USML
versus both TR07 and TGV at both discount rates; however,
outside the Northeast Corridor, where revenues are less than
life cycle costs, USML would require higher public investment
than TGV, though lower than for TR07. In the Northeast
Corridor, the revenue-to-cost ratio for USML would be about
the same as for TGV at the 7 percent discount rate, but higher
than for TR07, while at the 4 percent rate it would be higher
than for both TGV and TR07. The advantages for USML are more
pronounced when it is compared to other systems using existing
ROW, because of the superior ability of USML to operate on
curves at high speed.

USML produces public benefits of reduced environmental
pollution, petroleum consumption, and congestion at airports
because of its ridership diversion from highways and air
systems. Generally, these public benefits are also larger for
the USML than for TR07 or TGV because of its comparative
attractiveness as an alternative to air and auto travel.

A USML System Would Provide an Opportunity to Develop New
Technologies and Industries with Possible Benefits for U.S.
Businesses and the Work Force

The development of a USML system would enhance U.S.
competitiveness in HSGT, increase the Nation's productivity in
related fields, and generate both high technology and
construction jobs. U.S. businesses would develop a competitive
advantage in building the maglev systems

ES-4

in the United States and possibly abroad. There are a number
of elements of the USML system that have significant potential
for applications in other fields, giving U.S. business further
advantages. Finally, the technology development process itself
would require an estimated 15,500 person years of direct and
secondary labor-much of it consisting of high technology white
collar jobs-at a time when the United States faces less than
full employment of these resources because of decreased
defense spending.

A USML System is not Likely to be Developed without
significant Federal Government Investment

The technical and financial risk associated with development
of maglev and the long-term payback involved are significant,
and it is unlikely that private investors would finance a
significant share of the development costs. The major
development costs will be associated with the vehicle/guideway
interaction and propulsion/levitation/ guidance and control
issues. These are small relative to the high guideway
construction costs encountered in an implementation phase. The
industry partners involved in these intricate development
activities will not be the ones with the largest potential
return. The likelihood of industry supporting significant cost
sharing is very low. If maglev were implemented, the ultimate
sponsors (i.e., the state and local governments) would be
expected to share in the construction costs because they are
the ones to ultimately benefit and at that stage, the payback
period would be much reduced relative to the development
timeframe.

The above principal conclusions suggest that, with significant
Federal support, a high probability exists that U.S. industry
can develop a maglev system that is superior to existing
maglev and HSR technology. This USML would be faster than
existing HSGT systems and less expensive to build and operate
than the German maglev system. Recommendations related to such
a development program are discussed below.

Options for USML

Options for developing a maglev system for the United States
fall into several categories, including:

1. Reliance on existing maglev systems developed abroad.

2. Further development of existing maglev technology through
joint venture with Germany or Japan.

3. A program to develop a new USML.

Relying on existing maglev systems developed abroad has the
advantage of lower development costs, but it also has the
significant disadvantage of older technology that was not
designed for U.S. markets. The study has shown that there are
significant opportunities in the United States for the
application of HSGT technologies and that a U.S.-developed
maglev system would perform better than existing HSGT
technologies in some U.S. markets, in terms of costs versus
revenues and public benefits. Option one is not recommended.

Allowing joint ventures has advantages because it would enable
the development

ES-5

program to benefit from the experiences and advances of
established efforts. However, a joint venture would be more
acceptable if the principal efforts for redesign, test, and
upgrading were carried out in the United States.

A program to develop a new USML system would have several
advantages. In addition to the possible development of an
alternative for fast and convenient transportation between
cities up to 600 miles apart, such a program would also do
much to enhance the technological competitiveness of U.S.
industry. The disadvantages of such a development program are
its costs and associated development risks.

Recommendations

The NMI has concluded that the potential benefits from a U.S.
maglev system are sufficient to justify initiation of a
development program. During such a program, the remaining
technological, economic, and environmental questions must be
fully addressed so that maglev's full potential in an
integrated transportation system can be understood. Thus, it
is recommended that the Federal Government initiate the first
phase of a competitive-based USML development program to
develop an advanced maglev system. To benefit fully from
recent maglev development abroad, joint ventures between U.S.
companies and foreign companies should be permitted to the
extent that development activities take place substantially in
the United States.

It is further recommended, with select exceptions, that the
maglev development program be implemented within the general
framework of Section 1036 of the Intermodal Surface
Transportation Efficiency Act of 1991. The following
modifications are recommended:

. First, the time allowed for each of the phases should be
increased.

. Second, the new system should be tested at full-scale at a
Government test site.

. Third, the option for U.S. companies to involve foreign
partners in the new U.S. development effort should be
clarified.

Finally, because of the estimated development expense (about
$800 million) and the technological and financial risks of
such a development program, it is recommended that during the
life of the program there be formal milestones. These
milestones will occur in December 1994 in addition to the end
of each phase of the program, at which time the benefits and
costs of the program can be reevaluated. The first such
milestone, in December of 1994, will be based in part on
information available from the study of the commercial
feasibility of high-speed ground transportation mandated under
ISTEA.

A full description of the recommended approach is found in
Chapter 6.

ES-6

Chapter 1: Background

1.1 WHAT IS MAGLEV?

Magnetic levitation (maglev) is a relatively new
transportation technology in which noncontacting vehicles
travel safely at speeds of 250 to 300 miles-per-hour (112 m/s
to 134 m/s) or higher while suspended, guided, and propelled
above a guideway by magnetic fields. The guideway is the
physical structure along which maglev vehicles are levitated.
Various guideway configurations, e.g., T-shaped, U-shaped,
Y-shaped, and box-beam, made of steel, concrete, or aluminum,
have been proposed.

Figure 1.1 depicts the three primary functions basic to maglev
technology: (1) levitation or suspension; (2) propulsion;
and (3) guidance. In most current designs, magnetic forces are
used to perform all three functions, although a nonmagnetic
source of propulsion could be used. No consensus exists on an
optimum design to perform each of the primary functions.

1.1.1 Suspension Systems

The two principal means of levitation are illustrated in
Figures 1.2 and 1.3. Electromagnetic suspension (EMS) is an
attractive force levitation system whereby electromagnets on
the vehicle interact with and are attracted to ferromagnetic
rails on the guideway. EMS was made practical by advances in
electronic control systems that maintain the air gap between
vehicle and guideway, thus preventing contact.

Click HERE for graphic.

To convert from feet to meters, multiply by 0.3048

Click HERE for graphic.

Variations in payload weight, dynamic loads, and guideway
irregularities are compensated for by changing the magnetic
field in response to vehicle/guideway air gap measurements.

Electrodynamic suspension (EDS) employs magnets on the moving
vehicle to induce currents in the guideway. Resulting
repulsive force produces inherently stable vehicle support and
guidance because the magnetic repulsion increases as the
vehicle/guideway gap decreases. However, the vehicle must be
equipped with wheels or other forms of support for "takeoff"
and "landing" because the EDS will not levitate at speeds
below approximately 25 mph. EDS has progressed with advances
in cryogenics and superconducting magnet technology.

1.1.2 Propulsion Systems

"Long-stator" propulsion using an electrically powered linear
motor winding in the guideway appears to be the favored option
for high-speed maglev systems. It is also the most expensive
because of higher guideway construction costs.

"Short-stator" propulsion uses a linear induction motor (LIM)
winding onboard and a passive guideway. While short-stator
propulsion reduces guideway costs, the LIM is heavy and
reduces vehicle payload capacity, resulting in higher
operating costs and lower revenue potential compared to the
long-stator propulsion. A third alternative is a nonmagnetic
energy source (gas turbine or turboprop) but this, too,
results in a heavy vehicle and reduced operating efficiency.

1.1.3 Guidance Systems

Guidance or steering refers to the sideward forces that are
required to make the vehicle follow the guideway. The
necessary forces are supplied in an exactly analogous fashion
to the suspension forces, either attractive or repulsive. The
same magnets on board the vehicle which supply lift can be
used concurrently for guidance or separate guidance magnets
can be used.

1.1.4 Maglev and U.S. Transportation

Maglev systems could offer an attractive transportation
alternative for many time

1-2

sensitive trips of 100 to 600 miles in length, thereby
reducing air and highway congestion, air pollution, and energy
use, and releasing slots for more efficient long-haul service
at crowded airports. The potential value of maglev technology
was recognized in the Intermodal Surface Transportation
Efficiency Act of 1991 (ISTEA).

Prior to passage of the ISTEA, Congress had appropriated $26.2
million to identify maglev system concepts for use in the
United States and to assess the technical and economic
feasibility of these systems. Studies were also directed
toward determining the role of maglev in improving intercity
transportation in the United States. Subsequently, an
additional $9.8 million were appropriated to complete the NMI
Studies.

1.1.5 Why Maglev?

What are the attributes of maglev which commend its
consideration by transportation planners?

. Faster trips- high peak speed and high acceleration/braking
enable average speeds three to four times the national highway
speed limit of 65 mph (30 m/s) and lower door-to-door trip
time than high-speed rail or air (for trips under about 300
miles or 500 km). And still higher speeds are feasible.
Maglev takes up where high-speed rail leaves off, permitting
speeds of 250 to 300 mph (112 to 134 m/s) and higher.

. High reliability-less susceptible to congestion and weather
conditions than air or highway. Variance from schedule can
average less than one minute based on foreign high-speed rail
experience. This means intra- and intermodal connecting times
can be reduced to a few minutes (rather than the half-hour or
more required with airlines and Amtrak at present) and that
appointments can safely be scheduled without having to take
delays into account.

. Petroleum independence-with respect to air and auto as a
result of being electrically powered. Petroleum is unnecessary
for the production of electricity. In 1990, less than 5
percent of the Nation's electricity was derived from petroleum
whereas the petroleum used by both the air and automobile
modes comes primarily from foreign sources.

. Less polluting-with respect to air and auto, again as a
result of being electrically powered. Emissions can be
controlled more effectively at the source of electric power
generation than at the many points of consumption, such as
with air and automobile usage.

. Higher capacity-than air. At least 12,000 passengers per hour
in each direction with potential for even higher capacities at
3 to 4 minute headways. Provides sufficient capacity to
accommodate traffic growth well into the twenty-first century
and to provide an alternative to air and auto in the event of
an oil availability crisis.

. High safety-both perceived and actual, based on foreign
experience.

. Convenience-due to high frequency of service and the ability
to serve

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central business districts, airports, and other major
metropolitan area nodes.

. Improved comfort-with respect to air due to greater roominess,
which allows separate dining and conference areas with freedom
to move around. Absence of air turbulence ensures a
consistently smooth ride.

In contrast to the above attributes, there are other key
issues that need to be considered, such as noise,
electromagnetic fields, and right-of-way. These issues, along
with the above attributes, are addressed in the following
chapters of this report.

1.2 U.S. TRANSPORTATION ENVIRONMENT

The transportation system in the United States has been much
admired around the world. Its extensive highway and air
systems have facilitated business and leisure travel and
contributed to a high quality of life for many Americans. In
1990, 429 million passengers traveled 342 billion passenger
miles on commercial airlines. Americans traveled 2 trillion
passenger miles by car, truck, bus, and public transit and 6.1
billion passenger miles on Amtrak. The majority of these
riders, however, traveled by car or airplane, often on
overcrowded highways and through congested airports. As
population growth and shifts have occurred and travel has
increased, these systems have become stressed.

On the highways, development trends and travel patterns in
metropolitan areas are causing congestion on intercity routes.
Intercity highway travelers are now subject to delays that are
local in origin, especially during peak travel hours. A 1989
General Accounting Office report on highway congestion estimated
that by the year 2000, 70 percent of peak-hour travelers will
experience highway congestion delays with costs to the Nation
exceeding $100 billion annually. Approximately 91 percent of
all urban freeway delay occurs in 37 metropolitan areas with
populations greater than 1 million people. Many of these are
the same urban areas suffering from air pollution. A 1991
Federal Highway Administration (FHWA) report, "The Status of
the Nation's Highways and Bridges," stated:

By all performance measures of highway congestion and delay,
performance is declining Congestion now affects more areas,
more often, for longer periods and with more impacts on
highway users and the economy than any time in the nation's
history.

Congestion pricing and other management strategies, including
the implementation of Intelligent Vehicle/Highway Systems
(IVHS), which will allow electronic communication between
roads and vehicles to ease traffic problems, will provide some
congestion relief, particularly in metropolitan areas in the
near term. However, longer term strategies must be developed
that address the problems of through traffic.

Commercial air traffic has increased by 56 percent between
1980 and 1990 as consumer demand for fast intercity travel and
deregulation brought more competition with lower fares in the
airline industry. To meet travel demand, airlines have used
regional hubs to achieve more efficient use of aircraft and to
offer more varied and frequent service. This practice has
accentuated traffic peaking as flights from

1-5

several origins are brought together within a short period of
time at a single airport. If peaking and adverse weather
conditions converge, delays at one airport can cause backups
to ripple throughout the air travel system. Moreover,
commuter/regional carrier growth strains the airport and
airways system, contributing to congestion and delay by using
up valuable landing slots that could be reserved for larger
planes on more profitable, long-haul flights.

In 1987, 21 major airports experienced more than 20,000 hours
of flight delays in air carrier operations at a cost of $5
billion annually to American businesses and the aviation
industry. By the end of this century, if relief strategies are
not developed, 18 additional U.S. airports could experience
the same congestion at a cost of over $8 billion per year,
even with some planned capacity improvements in place. The
public is likely to encounter greater costs, diminished
convenience and quality of service, and possibly diminished
safety if strategies are not planned now that take account of
developing domestic and international travel needs.

Congestion on highways and airports wastes time and fuel and
increases pollution. It can constrain mobility to the extent
that economic growth and productivity could be adversely
affected. Although system management and capacity improvements
may provide some relief, adding more highway lanes and
building new airports in or near the larger cities is becoming
increasingly difficult. Land is costly and scarce. Adding new
highway capacity in urban areas typically costs more than $15
million per lane-mile. The new Denver airport is estimated to
cost about $3 billion. There is growing concern that a
continuation of the nearly exclusive reliance on flying
and driving, particularly in the most densely traveled
intercity corridors, will exacerbate environmental problems
and constrain capacity even further, causing the
transportation system to be more gridlocked and winglocked
during the next several decades.

Moreover, current intercity aviation and highway transportation
technologies are petroleum-dependent, accounting for 64 percent
of total petroleum use. Transportation-related petroleum use is
expected to remain high and at a level 38.5 percent above U.S.
petroleum production- contributing to the U.S. trade deficit and
dependence on oil imports with national security implications.
It will be important to develop transportation alternatives
that reduce petroleum dependency.

Added capacity can be provided in dense intercity corridors
with a new High-Speed Ground Transportation (HSGT) alternative-
maglev, which is capable of approaching the high speed of the
airplane, while offering some of the flexibility of the
automobile. Maglev, the fastest form of (HSGT), is more likely
than high-speed rail to attract medium-distance travelers from
air, as well as some drivers from the highway. Maglev has the
potential to complement existing transportation systems and
help meet transportation demand with few environmental
impacts. Electrically powered, it would be virtually
independent of petroleum-based fuels. It would connect to the
air and highway networks, smoothing their operations while
reducing air and highway congestion, air pollution, and energy
use. Maglev can contribute to meeting the transportation needs
of the future while improving the efficiency and lengthening
the life of existing highway

1-5

and air facilities. Investment in maglev development can
invigorate U.S. technological expertise and facilitate the
conversion of defense industry skills towards the solution of
infrastructure problems.

1.3 MAGLEV EVOLUTION

The concept of magnetically levitated trains was first
identified at the turn of the century by two Americans, Robert
Goddard and Emile Bachelet. By the 1930s, Germany's Hermann
Kemper was developing a concept and demonstrating the use of
magnetic fields to combine the advantages of trains and
airplanes. In 1968, Americans James R. Powell and Gordon T.
Danby were granted a patent on their design for a magnetic
levitation train.

Under the High-Speed Ground Transportation Act of 1965, the
FRA funded a wide range of research into all forms of HSGT
through the early 1970s. In 1971, the FRA awarded contracts to
the Ford Motor Company and the Stanford Research Institute for
analytical and experimental development of EMS and EDS
systems. FRA-sponsored research led to the development of the
linear electrical motor, the motive power used by all current
maglev prototypes. In 1975, after Federal funding for
high-speed maglev research in the United States was suspended,
industry virtually abandoned its interest in maglev; however,
research in low-speed maglev continued in the United States
until 1986.

Over the past two decades, research and development programs
in maglev technology have been conducted by several countries
including: Great Britain, Canada, Germany, and Japan. Germany
and Japan have invested over $1 billion each to develop and
demonstrate maglev technology for HSGT.

The German EMS maglev design, Transrapid (TR07), was certified
for operation by the German Government in December 1991. A
maglev line between Hamburg and Berlin is under consideration
in Germany with private financing and potentially with
additional support from individual states in northern Germany
along the proposed route. The line would connect with the
high-speed Intercity Express (ICE) train as well as
conventional trains. The TR07 has been tested extensively in
Emsland, Germany, and is the only high-speed maglev system in
the world ready for revenue service. The TR07 is planned for
implementation in Orlando, Florida.

The EDS concept under development in Japan uses a
superconducting magnet system. A decision will be made in 1997
whether to use maglev for the new Chuo line between Tokyo and
Osaka.

1.4 THE NATIONAL MAGLEV INITIATIVE (NMI)

Since the termination of Federal support in 1975, there was
little research into high-speed maglev technology in the
United States until 1990 when the National Maglev Initiative
(NMI) was established. The NMI is a cooperative effort of the
FRA of the DOT, the USACE, and the DOE, with support from
other agencies. The purpose of the NMI was to evaluate the
potential for maglev to improve intercity transportation and
to develop the information necessary for the Administration
and the Congress to determine the appropriate role for the

1-6

Federal Government in advancing this technology.

To achieve these goals, the NMI has conducted technical and
economic analyses and market feasibility studies of maglev
concepts, as well as research on associated energy,
environmental, health, and safety issues. In addition, four
contracts were funded to define new or improved maglev system
concept designs. Total funding for the NMI activities through
Fiscal Year (FY) 1993 is $36 million. More than a hundred
Government employees with appropriate expertise have been
supporting the program in addition to another hundred contract
personnel.

The challenge of the NMI was to integrate economic and
technical findings to provide a basis for recommendations on
the prospects for maglev in the United States. Clearly, it is
important to plan, analyze, and assess now in order to have an
option that will be available some 15 to 20 years hence.

To initiate a new untried transportation system entirely
through the private sector involves high capital costs and
high risk that few, if any, investors are willing to take.
Government institutional support and innovative financing
strategies would be necessary for maglev development. Such
public support would be consistent with other past and current
innovative transportation systems. In fact, from its
inception, the U.S. Government has aided and promoted
innovative transportation for economic, political, and social
development reasons. There are numerous examples. In the
nineteenth century, the Federal Government encouraged railroad
development to establish transcontinental links through such
actions as the massive land grant to the Illinois Central-Mobile
Ohio Railroads in 1850. Beginning in the 1920s, the Federal
Government provided commercial stimulus to the new technology of
aviation through contracts for airmail routes and funds which
paid for emergency landing fields, route lighting, weather
reporting, and communications. Later in the twentieth century,
Federal funds were used to construct the Interstate Highway
System and assist States and municipalities in the construction
and operation of airports. In 1971, the Federal Government
formed Amtrak to ensure rail passenger service for the United
States.

1.5 ISSUES ADDRESSED IN THIS REPORT

Each chapter in this report addresses a different set of
issues aimed at determining the potential for maglev in the
United States and the Federal role in its technological
development:

Chapter 2: The likely physical performance and cost
characteristics of a new maglev system designed and
built in the United States.

Chapter 3: The economic performance of such a system in
competition with other modes in specific intercity
corridor markets, in terms of costs, revenues, and
public benefits. Other national level impacts of
maglev, including effects on U.S. technological
competitiveness, both inside and out of the
transportation field, construction jobs, and other
macroeconomic effects.

1-7

Chapter 4: The economic performance and public benefits of the
U.S. system compared with existing HSGT technology
such as the German TR07 maglev and French high-
speed rail (HSR) Train a Grande Vitesse (TGV)
systems. Whether the added cost of developing a
U.S. system is justified by economic performance.

Chapter 5: Comparison of the economic and national impacts of the
following three options for acquiring HSGT technology:

. Acquire and install existing foreign systems.

. Improve new systems through a joint venture with
foreign developers.

. Develop a new U.S. designed system.

Chapter 6: The future role of maglev and recommendations on the
role of the U.S. Government in its development.

1-8

Chapter 2: Assessment of Maglev Technology

2.1 ANALYSIS PROCESS

In order to determine the technical feasibility of deploying
maglev in the United States, the NMI Office performed a
comprehensive assessment of the state-ofthe-art of maglev
technology. The process included:

. Determining and analyzing relevant critical technologies.

. Defining conceptual maglev systems that reflected the ideas
and talent of U.S. industry.

. Assessing maglev concepts defined by U.S. industry and
comparing these concepts with foreign HSGT systems.

. Estimating the cost of constructing and installing a maglev
system, using U.S. technology concepts.

2.1.1 Investigation of Critical Technologies

The NMI office initiated the critical technology investigation
in September 1990 by soliciting proposals from industry and
academia through a Broad Agency Announcement (BAA). There were
over 250 responses to the BAA leading to the award of 27
contracts totaling $4.4 million. The contracts addressed
innovative approaches for improving performance and
reliability and for reducing costs of maglev systems. Among
the topics addressed by the contract work were: maglev route
alignment and ROW; guideway sensor systems; noise of high-speed
rail and maglev; aerodynamic forces on maglev vehicles; power
transfer to high-speed vehicles; measurement and analysis of
magnetic fields; application of cable-in-conduit conductors for
maglev; safe speed enforcement; and parametric studies of
suspension and propulsion subsystems.

In addition, since little data are available about passenger
acceptance of the motions associated with advanced HSGT
systems, the NMI funded an experimental investigation of ride
quality criteria. An airplane was used to simulate rapid
banking, turning, acceleration, and braking of a maglev
vehicle traversing a route through the grades and curves
typical of an interstate highway.

2.1.2 Development of U.S. Maglev (USML) Concepts

The NMI initiated an assessment of U.S. industry's maglev
development potential in November 1991 by awarding four System
Concept Definition (SCD) contracts totaling $8.6 million. The
contract work was completed by September 1992. Each of the
four contractor teams defined a system concept by combining
the key elements of maglev technology (i.e., vehicle,
guideway, suspension, propulsion, braking, and control) into a
total transportation system. The systems were described in
terms of conceptual design detail, performance, cost, safety,
and other measures in order to illustrate their merit for
application to a next-generation 300 mph (134 m/s) maglev for
U.S. deployment.

2-1

2.1.3 Assessment of Technology

An independent Government Maglev System Assessment (GMSA) team
made up of scientists and engineers from the DOT, DOE, Army
Corps of Engineers, and experts from other Government
organizations, evaluated technology aspects of the SCDs. They
also reviewed and compared foreign HSGT alternatives.

The evaluation process consisted of two steps. The first step
was to obtain or develop mathematical models of
vehicle/guideway interaction, propulsion and power supply,
magnet force relationships, and system performance over
various trial routes. The second step was to use these models
to evaluate the various technologies in terms of system,
vehicle, and guideway requirements such as speed, capacity,
ride comfort, magnetic field effects, safety, structural
integrity, and power systems.

2.1.4 Cost Estimating

USACE staff, experienced in estimating the costs of large
civil construction projects, examined the SCD contractor cost
estimates for the guideway structure and associated
distance-related costs. The USACE staff modified the
contractor estimates where necessary to put each technology on
a common basis, e.g., standardizing the guideway height and
the contingency factors for overhead and profit. Each SCD
concept was evaluated in terms of five major components: 1)
guideway structure; 2) guideway magnetics; 3) power
distribution; 4) wayside control and communications; and 5)
power stations.

The Government staff used a standard method to estimate the
costs for each component of the U.S. baseline designs in the
SCD final reports as well as for the French TGV high-speed
rail system and the German Maglev TR07. Additional information
on this methodology is provided in Appendix A. The data used
for estimating TGV costs were taken primarily from the Texas
TGV proposal, while the TR07 costs were taken from the
Transrapid International/Bechtel proposal to build a maglev
system between Anaheim, CA and Las Vegas, NV. Cost estimates
are not available for the Japanese high-speed Maglev system.
The results of the Government cost analysis are presented in
Section 2.4.

2.2 OVERVIEW OF SYSTEM CONCEPTS

The four SCDs that the GMSA team evaluated were developed by
teams led by Bechtel, Foster-Miller, Grumman, and Magneplane
as examples of potential U.S. systems. The HSGT alternatives
to which the SCD concepts were compared were the French TGV
steel-wheel-on-rail system and the German TR07 Maglev system.
The Japanese high-speed Maglev system is also described in
this section, but is not included in Table 2.1 due to lack of
performance information. Table 2.1 summarizes the general
performance results of the GMSA team evaluation. The section
that follows briefly describes the alternative foreign HSGT
systems and the SCD concepts.

2.2.1 Existing HSGT Systems

Because there is no U.S.-based HSGT system in operation or
under test, the GMSA team compared the SCD concepts

2-2

Click HERE for graphic.

* In order to maximize TGV performance, the 200 mph Texas TGV
was used for calculations of trip time in Chapter 4 of this
report.

to foreign technology. Over the past two decades various
ground transportation systems have been developed overseas,
having operational speeds in excess of 150 mph (67 m/s),
compared to 125 mph (56 m/s) for the U.S. Metroliner. Several
steel-wheel-on-rail trains can maintain a speed of 167 to 186
mph (75 to 83 m/s), most notably the Japanese Series 300
Shinkansen, the German ICE, and the French TGV. The German
Transrapid Maglev train has demonstrated a speed of 270 mph
(121 m/s) on a test track, and the Japanese have operated a
maglev test car at 321 mph (144 m/s). The following are
descriptions of the French, German, and Japanese systems used
for comparison to the U.S. Maglev (USML) SCD concepts.

2.2.1.1 French Train a Grande Vitesse (TGV)

Click HERE for graphic.

The French National Railway's TGV is representative of the
current generation of high-speed, steel-wheel-on-rail trains.
The TGV has been in service for 12 years on the Paris-Lyon
(PSE) route and for 3 years on an initial portion of the
Paris-Bordeaux (Atlantique) route.

The Atlantique train consists of ten passenger cars with a
power car at each end. The power cars use synchronous rotary
traction motors for propulsion. Roof mounted pantographs
collect electric power from an overhead catenary. Cruise speed
is 186 mph (83 m/s). The train is nontilting and, thus,
requires a reasonably straight route alignment to sustain high
speed. Although the operator controls the train speed,
interlocks exist including automatic overspeed protection and
enforced braking. Braking is by a combination of rheostat
brakes and axle-mounted disc brakes. All axles possess antilock
braking. Power axles have anti-slip control.

The TGV track structure is that of a conventional
standard-gauge railroad with a well engineered base (compacted
granular materials). The track consists of continuous-welded
rail on concrete/steel ties with elastic fasteners. Its
high-speed switch is a conventional swing-nose turnout. The
TGV operates on pre-existing tracks, but at a substantially
reduced speed. Because of its high speed, high power, and
antiwheel slip control, the TGV can climb grades that are
about twice as great as normal in U.S. railroad practice and,
thus, can follow the gently rolling terrain of France without
extensive and expensive viaducts and tunnels.

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2.2.1.2 German TR07

Click HERE for graphic.

The German TR07 is the high-speed Maglev system nearest to
commercial readiness. If financing can be obtained, ground
breaking will take place in Florida in 1993 for a 14 mile (23
km) shuttle between Orlando International Airport and the
amusement zone at International Drive. The TR07 system is also
under consideration for a high-speed link between Hamburg and
Berlin and between downtown Pittsburgh and the airport.

As the designation suggests, TR07 was preceded by at least six
earlier models. In the early seventies, German firms,
including Krauss-Maffei, MBB and Siemens, tested full-scale
versions of an air cushion vehicle (TR03) and a repulsion maglev
vehicle using superconducting magnets. After a decision was made
to concentrate on attraction maglev in 1977, advancement
proceeded in significant increments, with the system evolving
from linear induction motor (LIM) propulsion with wayside power
collection to the linear synchronous motor (LSM), which employs
variable frequency, electrically powered coils on the guideway.
TR05 functioned as a people-mover at the International Traffic
Fair Hamburg in 1979, carrying 50,000 passengers and providing
valuable operating experience.

2-5

The TR07, which operates on 19.6 miles (31.5 km) of guideway
at the Emsland test track in northwest Germany, is the
culmination of nearly 25 years of German Maglev development,
costing over $1 billion. It is a sophisticated EMS system,
using separate conventional iron-core attracting
electromagnets to generate vehicle lift and guidance. The
vehicle wraps around a T-shaped guideway. The TR07 guideway
uses steel or concrete beams constructed and erected to very
tight tolerances. Control systems regulate levitation and
guidance forces to maintain a -inch gap (8 to 10 mm) between
the magnets and the iron "tracks" on the guideway. Attraction
between vehicle magnets and edge-mounted guideway rails
provide guidance. Attraction between a second set of vehicle
magnets and the propulsion stator packs underneath the
guideway generate lift. The lift magnets also serve as the
secondary or rotor of a LSM, whose primary or stator is an
electrical winding running the length of the guideway.

TR07 uses two or more nontilting vehicles in a consist. TR07
propulsion is by a long-stator LSM. Guideway stator windings
generate a traveling wave that interacts with the vehicle
levitation magnets for synchronous propulsion. Centrally
controlled wayside stations provide the requisite
variable-frequency, variable-voltage power to the LSM. Primary
braking is regenerative through the LSM, with eddy-current
braking and high-friction skids for emergencies. TR07 has
demonstrated safe operation at 270 mph (121 m/s) on the
Emsland track. It is designed for cruise speeds of 311 mph
(139 m/s).

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2.2.1.3 Japanese High-Speed Maglev

Click HERE for graphic.

The Japanese have spent over $1 billion developing both
attraction and repulsion maglev systems. The HSST attraction
system, developed by a consortium often identified with Japan
Airlines, is actually a series of vehicles designed for 100,
200, and 300 km/h. Sixty miles-per-hour (100 km/h) HSST
Maglevs have transported over two million passengers at
several Expos in Japan and the 1989 Canada Transport Expo in
Vancouver. The highspeed Japanese repulsion Maglev system is
under development by Railway Technical Research Institute
(RTRI), the research arm of the newly privatized Japan Rail
Group. RTRI's ML500 research vehicle achieved the world
high-speed guided ground vehicle speed record of 321 mph
(144 m/s) in December 1979, a record which still stands, although
a specially modified French TGV rail train has come close. A
manned three-car MLU001 began testing in 1982. Subsequently, the
single car MLU002 was destroyed by fire in 1991. Its
replacement, the MLU002N, is being used to test the side wall
levitation that is planned for eventual revenue system use. The
principal activity at present is the construction of a $2
billion, 27-mile (43 km) maglev test line through the mountains
of Yamanashi Prefecture, where testing of a revenue prototype is
scheduled to commence in 1994.

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The Central Japan Railway Company plans to begin building a
second high-speed line from Tokyo to Osaka on a new route
(including the Yamanashi test section) starting in 1997. This
will provide relief for the highly profitable Tokaido
Shinkansen, which is nearing saturation and needs
rehabilitation. To provide ever improving service, as well as
to forestall encroachment by the airlines on its present 85
percent market share, higher speeds than the present 171 mph
(76 m/s) are regarded as necessary. Although the design speed
of the first generation maglev system is 311 mph (139 m/s),
speeds up to 500 mph (223 m/s) are projected for future
systems. Repulsion maglev has been chosen over attraction
maglev because of its reputed higher speed potential and
because the larger air gap accommodates the ground motion
experienced in Japan's earthquake-prone territory.

The design of Japan's repulsion system is not firm. A 1991
cost estimate by Japan's Central Railway Company, which would
own the line, indicates that the new high-speed line through
the mountainous terrain north of Mt. Fuji would be very
expensive, about $100 million per mile (8 million yen per
meter) for a conventional railway.

A maglev system would cost 25 percent more. A significant part
of the expense is the cost of acquiring surface and subsurface
ROW. Knowledge of the technical details of Japan's high-speed
Maglev is sparse. What is known is that it will have
superconducting magnets in bogies with sidewall levitation,
linear synchronous propulsion using guideway coils, and a
cruise speed of 311 mph (139 m/s).

2.2.2 U.S. Contractors' Maglev Concepts (SCDs)

Three of the four SCD concepts use an EDS system in which
superconducting magnets on the vehicle induce repulsive lift
and guidance forces through movement along a system of passive
conductors mounted on the guideway. The fourth SCD concept
uses an EMS system similar to the German TR07. In this
concept, attraction forces generate lift and guide the vehicle
along the guideway. However, unlike TR07, which uses
conventional magnets, the attraction forces of the SCD EMS
concept are produced by superconducting magnets. The following
individual descriptions highlight the significant features of
the four U.S. SCDs.

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2.2.2.1 Bechtel SCD

Click HERE for graphic.

The Bechtel concept is an EDS system that uses a novel
configuration of vehicle-mounted, flux-canceling magnets. The
vehicle contains six sets of eight superconducting magnets per
side and straddles a concrete box-beam guideway. Interaction
between the vehicle magnets and a laminated aluminum ladder on
each guideway sidewall generates lift. Similar interaction
with guideway mounted nullflux coils provides guidance. LSM
propulsion windings, also attached to the guideway sidewalls,
interact with vehicle magnets to produce thrust. Centrally
controlled wayside stations provide the required
variable-frequency, variablevoltage power to the LSM.

The Bechtel vehicle consists of a single car with an inner
tilting shell. It uses aerodynamic control surfaces to augment
magnetic guidance forces. In an emergency, it delevitates onto
air-bearing pads. The guideway consists of a post-tensioned
concrete box girder. Because of high magnetic fields, the
concept calls for nonmagnetic, fiber-reinforced plastic (FRP)
post-tensioning rods and stirrups in the upper portion of the
box beam. The switch is a bendable beam constructed entirely
of FRP.

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2.2.2.2 Foster-Miller SCD

Click HERE for graphic.

The Foster-Miller concept is an EDS similar to the Japanese
high-speed Maglev, but has some additional features to improve
potential performance. The Foster-Miller concept has a vehicle
tilting design that would allow it to operate through curves
faster than the Japanese system for the same level of
passenger comfort. Like the Japanese system, the Foster-Miller
concept uses superconducting vehicle magnets to generate lift
by interacting with null-flux levitation coils located in the
sidewalls of a U-shaped guideway. Magnet interaction with
guideway-mounted, electrical propulsion coils provides
null-flux guidance. Its innovative propulsion scheme is called
a locally commutated linear synchronous motor (LCLSM).
Individual "H-bridge" inverters sequentially energize
propulsion coils directly under the bogies. The inverters
synthesize a magnetic wave that travels along the
guideway at the same speed as the vehicle.

The Foster-Miller vehicle is composed of articulated passenger
modules and tail and nose sections that create multiple-car
"consists." The modules have magnet bogies at each end that
they share with adjacent cars. Each bogie contains four
magnets per side. The U-shaped guideway consists of two
parallel, post-tensioned concrete beams joined transversely by
precast concrete diaphragms. To avoid adverse magnetic
effects, the upper posttensioning rods are FRP. The high-speed
switch uses switched null-flux coils to guide the vehicle
through a vertical turnout. Thus, the Foster-Miller switch
requires no moving structural members.

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2.2.2.3 Grumman SCD

Click HERE for graphic.

The Grumman concept is an EMS with similarities to the German
TR07. However, Grumman's vehicles wrap around a Y-shaped
guideway and use a common set of vehicle magnets for
levitation, propulsion, and guidance. Guideway rails are
ferromagnetic and have LSM windings for propulsion. The
vehicle magnets are superconducting coils around
horseshoe-shaped iron cores. The pole faces are attracted to
iron rails on the underside of the guideway.
Nonsuperconducting control coils on each iron-core leg
modulate levitation and guidance forces to maintain a 1.6 inch
(40 mm) air gap. No secondary suspension is required to maintain
adequate ride quality. Propulsion is by conventional LSM
embedded in the guideway rail.

Grumman vehicles may be single- or multi-car consists with
tilt capability. The innovative guideway superstructure
consists of slender Y-shaped guideway sections (one for each
direction) mounted by outriggers every 15-feet to a 90-foot
(4.5 m to a 27 m) spline girder. The structural spline girder
serves both directions. Switching is accomplished with a
TR07-style bending guideway beam, shortened by use of a
sliding or rotating section.

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2.2.2.4 Magneplane SCD

Click HERE for graphic.

The Magneplane concept is a single-vehicle EDS using a
trough-shaped 0.8 inch (20 mm) thick aluminum guideway for
sheet levitation and guidance. Magneplane vehicles self-bank
up to 45 degrees in curves. Earlier laboratory work on this
concept validated the levitation, guidance, and propulsion
schemes. Superconducting levitation and propulsion magnets are
grouped in bogies at the front and rear of the vehicle. The
centerline magnets interact with conventional LSM windings for
propulsion and also generate some electromagnetic
"roll-righting torque" called the keel effect. The magnets on
the sides of each bogie react against the aluminum guideway
sheets to provide levitation.

The Magneplane vehicle uses aerodynamic control surfaces to
provide active motion damping. The aluminum levitation sheets
in the guideway trough form the tops of two structural
aluminum box beams. These box beams are supported directly on
piers. The high-speed switch uses switched null-flux coils to
guide the vehicle through a fork in the guideway trough. Thus,
the Magneplane switch requires no moving structural members.

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2.3 FINDINGS

2.3.1 Opportunities for Technology Improvements

A major factor leading to the creation of the NMI was the
myriad claims by USML proponents regarding opportunities for
technological improvements relative to foreign maglev systems.
The NMI critical technology investigation focused on these
claims. Some have been verified, while others appear to be
unfounded or exaggerated. The following are some of the
significant findings from the technology investigation:

. A U.S. 300-mph (500 km/h) maglev system is feasible. U.S.
industry and academia have the capability to compete with
foreign maglev developments. Assessment of the four conceptual
designs elicited from U.S. firms concludes there are many
areas where improvements can be made with systems more suited
to U.S. geography and demographics.

. Tilting mechanisms have been designed for maglev vehicles that
allow them to follow existing ROW at speeds substantially
higher than the design speed of existing maglev technologies.
In those cases where land is unavailable or too costly, this
will provide an acceptable alternative route.

. In connection with the above finding, it has also been
established by experiment that most people do not suffer ill
effects from the large tilt angles and rates of turn involved
in following existing ROW at high speed.

. Magnetic fields created by a maglev system can be attenuated
to normal urban levels without severe weight or cost
penalties. Measurements of magnetic fields aboard existing
transportation systems reveal that fields substantially in
excess of ambient occur in and around certain electrically
powered systems, just as is the case with many home and office
appliances. However, the steady magnetic fields measured
aboard the Transrapid Maglev vehicle are no greater than the
earth's field. Although the magnetic fields generated by
superconducting magnets are greater than the Transrapid
values, design approaches exist to maintain the fields in the
passenger compartment to acceptable levels.

. Procedures have been identified for the use of new composite
materials and innovative vehicle and component designs, which
can reduce the weight of maglev vehicles and energy
consumption. In addition, the application of sophisticated
manufacturing and erection techniques to guideway construction
may greatly reduce the transportation and site preparation
costs associated with building in or near existing ROW.

. Overcoming aerodynamic drag on vehicles is the dominant factor
in energy consumption at 300 mph (134 m/s). Research shows
there are ways of reducing drag which provides a fruitful area
for additional research.

. Maglev systems can offer significant energy savings relative
to air and auto when configured in multiple-car consists due
to less than the proportional increase in aerodynamic

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drag. However, there appears to be no energy advantage for
single or dual car consists.

. Maglev has the potential for being quieter than conventional
trains at speeds below 155 mph (69 m/s), which is an important
consideration when traveling in urban areas where speed
restrictions will most likely be in place. At speeds above 155
mph (69 m/s), most of the noise produced by a vehicle is of
aereodynamic origin, whether it is on rail or levitated. As in
other transportation modes, methods exist to alleviate noise
where necessary.

. The power semiconductors that are required to regulate the
propulsion currents in the guideway will require improvements
in the state of the art, particularly in regard to bringing
costs down. U.S. manufacturers are in a favorable position to
accomplish this and improve their market position with respect
to allied products as well.

. Developments in high temperature superconductors have made
such progress in the past 2 years that it is prudent to
consider designs for superconducting magnets and cryostats
which incorporate this new technology. Avoiding very low
temperatures would reduce complexity, weight, and operating
and maintenance costs for cryogenic systems.

. Innovative operational strategies, such as single-car,
nonstop, point-to-point service, can provide faster travel
between suburban stations, making the maglev system more
competitive relative to the automobile.

. Maglev systems can take advantage of existing infrastructure
to provide access to city centers and intermodal facilities.
In many cities, existing bridges, tunnels, and transportation
corridors are not being used to full capacity and could be
inexpensively modified to accommodate maglev. Techniques exist
for coupling maglev vehicles to, or mounting them on, rail
vehicles to provide near term access to rail terminals until
maglev facilities can be built in these congested areas.

. The large air gaps made possible with superconducting magnets
do not appear to lead to any significant guideway cost savings
compared to small gap EMS systems. Ride quality, rather than
gap control, is the significant factor in setting guideway
precision and rigidity requirements. However, large air gaps
do enhance the safety of the system by increasing the
tolerance to nondesign irregularities arising from damage,
earthquakes, or improper maintenance.

. In order to take full advantage of a large air gap, a
suspension with sophisticated characteristics, such as some
combination of feedback, preview, and adaptive control, is
needed. Such a suspension may allow lower guideway fabrication
and maintenance tolerances, consequently reducing associated
costs. While the current SCD designs are capable of traversing
a single large perturbation of guideway geometry, these
suspensions cannot traverse repeated guideway irregularities
and offer a comfortable ride. Research to determine the
optimum suspension force-control characteristic is ongoing.

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In addition to the preceding findings, several worthwhile
innovations surfaced as a result of the SCD work. Examples
are:

. An advanced, high power, efficient propulsion system and a
30-degree tilt capability would allow maglev to negotiate
existing highway or railroad ROW, where that is the preferred
option, at much higher average speeds than is possible with
the existing German Transrapid and Japanese systems.

. The individual control and activation of each guideway
propulsion coil for the LSM, known as local commutation, was
once regarded as impractical. Millions of silicon switching
devices would be required for an intercity route, but if the
trend of reduced costs with volume applies here as it has with
other semiconductor devices, the LCLSM will lower cost while
enhancing propulsion performance. Research is in progress to
further assess this concept which could provide an important
strategic advantage for American competitiveness in
semiconductor technology.

. A spinoff of the locally commutated LSM is the capability to
use the same coil system to transfer auxiliary (hotel) power
from the guideway onto the vehicle, with an attendant
reduction in on-board battery requirements. The advantage is
reduced vehicle weight and improved safety.

. Applying the rapid advances in power semiconductor technology,
in which the United States has a lead, will enable substantial
reductions in size, weight, and cost. Also, improvement in the
efficiencies of power conditioning equipment for both vehicle
and wayside systems will be provided.

. Some of the SCD concepts allow maglev vehicles to make use of
completely electronic switches (turnouts). These switches have
no moving parts and, therefore, could substantially reduce the
costs of achieving the tolerances required for rapid
activation. Higher vehicle speeds through the switch and
reduced headways improve trip time and increase system
capacity.

. Novel helical winding designs for LSM may allow operation at
higher voltages with improved electrical efficiency, better
power factor, and no component and installation cost penalty.

2.3.2 Safety

Studies have been underway for the last 2 years in the FRA's
Office of Research and Development on the subject of highspeed
guided ground transportation safety. The key areas that may be
of concern as any maglev technology moves towards
implementation in the United States are:

. High-speed collision avoidance (automation, guideway
integrity, shared ROW).

. Adequate protection for high mass low speed collisions and low
mass high-speed collisions.

. Emergency response plans and procedures (fire safety,
evacuation methods, training).

. Electromagnetic field generation and effects (passengers,
workers, public).

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. Operational issues (weather, automation and human factors,
etc.).

Included in the overall assessment of maglev technology are
the safety concepts from both design and operational view
points. Current safety studies do not indicate any
safety-related issues that cannot be accommodated through
system safety design considerations in an appropriate
development program.

As with aircraft, the high speed of maglev appears to make it
infeasible to design a practical system that could withstand a
high-speed collision. Accordingly, the proper approach is to
ensure that collisions do not occur. Although this approach
has not been used in U.S. railroad practice in the past, the
fact is that foreign high-speed rail has a flawless record.

The Japanese Shinkansen has been in operation for 30 years,
has carried 3.5 billion passengers, and has never had a
high-speed collision nor caused a passenger fatality.
Likewise, the French TGV has operated for 12 years, carrying a
quarter billion passengers. There has never been a passenger
fatality on the grade-separated French high-speed line. Thus,
it is possible to reduce the probability of collisions to an
acceptable level. This must be the focus of the design for
maglev safety as contrasted with crash survivability.

The overall safety of a USML system must be reviewed and
analyzed from the start of the design phase right through and
including the operational phase in an ongoing and systematic
manner. Keeping the overall safety of a maglev system within
acceptable levels as the technology proceeds to the deployment
stage will reduce the potential for unplanned design
modifications or prohibitive operational restrictions or
procedures that could threaten the basic viability of the maglev
system.

2.4 SYNTHESIS OF A U.S. MAGLEV SYSTEM

The purpose of the SCD exercise was to provide an opportunity
to show what U.S. industry was capable of doing relative to
foreign maglev competition, educating the industry itself and
the Government in the process. It was not the intention to
select a winner at this stage. Instead, the NMI has attempted
to employ all the information collected from the technology
assessment process, take the best features therefrom, and
synthesize them into performance capabilities of a USML.
(Obviously, care must be taken to ensure that the components
of such a USML system are compatible.)

For example, it is now clear that the structural properties of
a maglev guideway, such as beam rigidity and accuracy of
alignment, need to be the same for all maglev systems, because
they derive from ride quality considerations which are the
same for all passenger carrying systems. Some of the SCD
contractors arrived at more efficient girder designs, which
are applicable to the other concepts. We have incorporated
appropriate associated cost savings in the economic model.

An economic model requires only a general description of a
maglev system in order to predict costs, ridership, revenue,
and the like. Accordingly, the USML system which is
incorporated into the economic model consists only of
performance and cost data and does not

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include, for instance, a depiction of the system.
Specifically, the USML is defined in terms of maximum speed,
acceleration, banking capability, grade and curving
capability, and guideway and related costs as specified in
Figure 2.8 and Table 2.2. The principal features of the USML
were chosen on the basis of reducing trip time on existing
ROW, which appeared to be the intent of Congress, and is
important to making maglev competitive with short haul air.
This was accomplished by providing a 30 banking capability
and a high performance propulsion system. (Had other
objectives prevailed, the USML could have been less energy
intensive, less costly or even more comfortable, but only
at the expense of some other objective.) It should be noted
when referring to Figure 2.8 that the NMI work defined normal
maximum ride comfort during acceleration to be 0.16g. The
additional acceleration capacity depicted for the USML
represents potential power to maintain 0.16g, climbing steep
grades and powering through turns such as might be required
when following existing U.S. ROW for highways and railroads.

The estimated guideway cost for USML, TR07 and TGV are shown
in Table 2.2. TR07 and TGV costs were obtained by analyzing
published data, and the cost of the USML was based upon
Government

Click HERE for graphic.

Note: (1) Modified Train a Grand Vitesse (TGV) proposed for
the Texas HSR System.
(2) Includes only distance-related technology costs.
(3) German Maglev System.
(4) A construction financing cost is included in these
estimates using the 7 percent discount rate.

l g is acceleration due to earth's gravity, 32.2 ft/sec (9.8
m/sec2).

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Click HERE for graphic.

estimates and data provided by the SCD contractors (see
Appendix A). The costs in the first two rows of Table 2.2
include only distance-related costs of the guideway structure,
electric power supply, propulsion, and control systems. They
do not include vehicle costs, the costs of major facilities,
such as stations and maintenance or control centers, site
preparation, earth moving, tunneling or long span bridges,
land acquisition, program management, and contingencies;
however, all of these costs are included in the third row of
Table 2.2 and in the economic analysis in Chapters 3 and 4 of
this report. These latter costs are site specific, but can add
$9 million to $27 million per mile ($6 thousand to $17
thousand per meter) beyond the technology cost.

Examination of Table 2.2 reveals several interesting features
of the hypothetical USML. If an elevated system is desired for
reasons of safety, ROW access or other operational
considerations, USML could offer some advantages. It could
provide the best performance (quicker accelerations leading to
lower trip times) and the lowest technology cost. For systems
constructed mostly at-grade, the situation becomes more
complicated. TGV offers the lowest technology cost, but at
significantly reduced performance. However, as shown in Chapters
3 and 4, the increased ridership and revenue resulting from the
USML's anticipated higher performance offsets its higher costs.
Thus, even for at-grade systems, the USML could offer an overall
advantage. The USML also could offer a decided cost advantage
over the TR07 at-grade. The current design of the TR07
requires that a guideway be supported by short piers, even
at-grade, which precludes the full cost advantage of a
continuously supported structure.

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Chapter 3: The Potential for Maglev Application in
U.S. Intercity Transportation

3.1 OVERVIEW

This chapter explores how well a USML system, as defined in
Section 2.4, would perform economically, in terms of revenues,
costs, and public benefits, if such a system were built in
specific intercity corridors. Principal findings are that:

. Maglev revenues would cover operating costs and contribute to
the payment of capital costs in all but one of 16 corridors
studied.

. Using a 7 percent discount rate, maglev revenues would cover
total operating and capital costs in one corridor under the
baseline scenario*, but, for most of the other 15 study
corridors, revenues would cover only about 40 percent of total
costs. The high initial investment will require substantial
public assistance.

. With a 4 percent discount rate one corridor's revenue would
exceed total costs by a wide margin for the baseline
scenario*, and for most of the other study corridors, revenues
would cover about 55 percent of total costs.

. Under a more favorable economic scenario*, financial
performance would be improved; 2 of the study corridors would
cover total costs at the 7 percent discount rate and 6 at the
4 percent discount rate. Intercorridor system effects could
further improve financial performance.

. Maglev has positive social benefits from congestion, petroleum
and emission reductions and from improvements to passenger
safety which may justify the expenditure of public funds.

3.2 ANALYTICAL APPROACH AND METHOD

3.2.1 General Approach

Initially 26 corridors were identified where High-Speed Ground
Transportation (HSGT) would be most likely to perform well.
This identification was based primarily on the number of
current air trips of less than 600 miles, since trips diverted
from air travel have been shown to be the largest source of
revenue. Sixteen of these corridors were chosen for detailed
analysis of maglev performance under various conditions. These
16 corridors are shown on a map in Figure 3.1 and listed in
Table 3.1. A listing of all 26 corridors is provided in Table
3.10.

In each corridor the revenues, operating costs, and capital
costs associated with a USML system were estimated for two
different types of route alignments and two different
"scenarios" using 1991 dollars. Thus, it was possible to
evaluate the performance in each corridor in purely financial
terms (i.e., revenue versus cost) using measures such as the
ratio of revenue-to-costs or the excess (or deficit) of
revenues over costs. In addition, public benefits attributed
to maglev were

* See Page 3-4, Table 3-2 for definition

3-1

Click HERE for graphic.

estimated and, where possible, given a monetary value to
determine the extent to which public benefits could compensate
for revenue deficiencies.

3.2.2 Routes and Scenarios

Two types of maglev alignments were considered:

. An alignment with extensive sharing (ES) of existing highway
and railroad ROW, with the shared portion amounting to about
80 percent of its length.

. A mainly new alignment with limited sharing (LS) of existing
highway and railroad ROW with the shared portion occurring
mainly in urban areas and amounting to about 35 percent of its
length.

The lengths for the ES and LS alignments in the 16 study
corridors are provided in Table 3.1. The LS ROW for a corridor
has fewer and less severe curves than the ES ROW and is
usually shorter. This permits higher maglev operating speeds,
resulting in shorter trip times.

Two socioeconomic scenarios were considered: a "baseline"
scenario using conservative assumptions, and a "favorable"
scenario using less conservative assumptions.

The assumptions for each scenario are listed in Table 3.2.

3-2

Click HERE for graphic.

3-3

Click HERE for graphic.

3.2.3 Trip Times

Trip times for maglev and competing modes of travel were
estimated under a consistent set of assumptions regarding
their respective operating environments, and these trip times
were used in estimating the percentage of trips diverted to
maglev. Trip times included estimates for terminal access and
egress times at either end of the trip and time spent in
terminals. The time on the maglev line itself between each pair
of stations was obtained by simulating the operation of a USML
vehicle with a particular pattern of intermediate stops, urban
speed limits, and technical characteristics such as top speed,
rates of acceleration and deceleration, and bank angles when
rounding curves. The routes were generated based on maps and
geographic information systems and made use of highway
location and topographic information.

3-4

Figure 3.2 provides a comparison of maglev and air trip times.
Maglev has a line haul trip time advantage over air up to
about 200 miles, and a total trip time advantage over air up
to about 300 miles. Maglev's total trip time disadvantage is
relatively small even at 600 miles suggesting that some air
passengers in such markets would divert to maglev.

Demand for maglev is strongest in markets where its trip times
compare favorably to those of other competing modes. Table 3.3
compares line haul and total (including terminal access, etc.)
trip times for the maglev, auto, and air modes between end point
metropolitan areas for 16 study corridors in the year 2000.
These are estimates of trip times travelers would actually
experience for both air and maglev.

As illustrated in Table 3.3, the line haul trip time for
maglev is greater than air

Click HERE for graphic.

Notes: (1) Maglev line haul trip time based on use of the LS
alignment.
(2) Data are averages for city pairs from the 16 study
corridors in each distance range.
(3) Total trip time includes in-terminal processing time
and time for local access and egress to terminals.
(4) Trip time estimates include appropriate adjustments
for congestion delays, stops, speed restrictions, etc.

3-5

Click HERE for graphic.

3-6

unless the short distance gives maglev a slight advantage.
This table also shows, however, that when total trip time is
considered, the air mode's advantage over maglev is generally
reduced or eliminated because of the maglev mode's usual
advantage in terminal access and processing time. Most other
city pairs in the study corridors are closer together than
those listed in these tables, thus having maglev trip times
that are more favorable relative to air than those listed. The
maglev's trip time advantage relative to the auto mode is also
evident, especially for city pairs that are separated by long
distances.

3.2.4 Fares

Regarding fares and auto operating costs, maglev competes
primarily with air, consequently, maglev fares are expressed
as a percentage of the air fare calculated for each market. A
value of 90 percent was used, but lowered in markets where the
maglev mode had a large trip time disadvantage. The fare used
for the USML design was at or close to the net revenue-
maximizing fare.

3.2.5 Ridership and Revenues Estimation

Estimating maglev revenue involved five steps. First, 1988
trips by mode (air, auto, and rail) were estimated for each
origin/destination (OD) market and allocated between business
and nonbusiness purposes. Second, these trips were forecast
for the years 2000 to 2030 at 10-year intervals. Third, maglev
diversions from each mode/purpose category were estimated
using a mathematical model of predicted passenger behavior.
Relative trip times, fares, and frequencies of service of
the competing modes were used to estimate the percentage of
trips that would be diverted to maglev. Fourth, the maglev
trips in each category were multiplied by the maglev fare.
Fifth, the totals were increased by 10 or 20 percent to
reflect induced travel. The process included adjustments for
special circumstances associated with intercity markets under
85 miles and the air passenger transfer market.

A key step in the process is the projection of trips over the
study period. While growth rates differ by mode and city pair,
the overall pattern is summarized for the 16 corridors in
Figure 3.3. The growth rate for air is higher than for auto,
averaging 2.4-percent per year. This is considerably below the
air 5.2 percent growth rate from 1978 to 1988, but it leads to
2030 air trips increasing to about 2.7 times their 1988
levels.

3.2.6 Cost Estimation

Estimating the cost of constructing the USML system took into
account not only the "technology costs" discussed in Section
2.4, but also nontechnology costs elements such as ROW
preparation, surveying, fencing, access roads, land
acquisition, traffic control, and demolition/ reconstruction
of existing buildings, roads, and utilities. Costs were
estimated for combinations of terrain and degree of
urbanization, taking into account whether existing ROW was to
be used, the percentage of the maglev guideway estimated to be
at grade or elevated, and regional construction cost
variations.

Estimates of operating costs were based on providing a
full-service organization to run the system in each separate
corridor. Personnel levels were estimated according to

3-7

the size and length of the system and the amount of service
provided, assuming an average load factor of 65 percent. Costs
of energy and materials were also included.

3.2.7 Financial Assessment

Most of the financial assessment in this section involves the
use of either the revenue-to-cost ratio or the difference
between revenues and costs associated with building and
operating a USML system. These values are developed by first
discounting future revenues for the years 2000 to 2040 back to
the year 200O, a hypothetical year when operations might
begin. It is intended to reflect the average return to capital
investments in all sectors of the economy and thus, the social
opportunity cost of using resources for maglev investments. It
should be considered that initial capital costs would occur on
average 1.5 years before opening. Therefore, instead of using
a discount factor, a 1.5-year premium was added to the cost.

Click HERE for graphic.

Notes: (1) Corridor and overall averages are weighted using
city pair trips as weights.
(2) Underlying growth rates estimated from regional
demographic and economic trends.
(3) Average annual growth rate for air is 2.4 percent and
auto is 1.5 percent.
(4) The "high" and "low" figures for air represent the
fastest (Florida) and the slowest (Chicago Detroit)
growth corridors, respectively.

3-8

A discount rate of 7 percent with constant dollar values was
used. This is the equivalent of 10.5 or 11 percent in market
terms (where inflation is taken into account instead of using
constant dollars) and is required to be used by the Office of
Management and Budget for making economic decisions regarding
all Federal Government sponsored or assisted projects. It is
intended to reflect the average return to capital investments
in all sectors of the economy and, thus, the social
opportunity cost of using resources for maglev investments. It
should be considered as a "baseline" discount rate for the
purpose of this report.

In addition, a discount rate of 4 percent with constant dollar
values was also used as sensitivity analysis, to reflect the
type of bond financing that is likely to be available to
sponsors of HSGT projects in the future. When translated into
market terms, 4 percent is the equivalent of 7.5 or 8 percent.
The market yield of tax exempt interest state and municipal
bonds is now about 6 percent and the Administration has
supported making available such tax-free interest financing,
without annual limits, to sponsors of HSGT projects.
Therefore, the rate used is somewhat higher than the tax-free
bond rate and would allow a slight margin for risk and/or
higher prevailing rates in the future. Nevertheless, the
7-percent constant dollar rate should be used as the primary
basis in benefit/cost analysis for Government decision making.

3.2.8

Estimates were made of benefits from the relief of air
congestion, reductions of petroleum usage and emissions of
airborne chemicals, and safety improvements.

The procedure for air congestion relief was to estimate the
reduction in the future growth of traffic at key airports due
to diversion to maglev and to estimate the effect of this on
the average delay for people who continue to use the airports.
Reduced levels of petroleum usage and emissions and safety
impacts were estimated from the altered modal distributions of
passenger miles and the projected petroleum usage and emission
and safety rates of those modes.

3.3 ESTIMATES OF MAGLEV RIDERSHIP, REVENUE, AND COSTS

Revenue and cost estimates are derived from corridor-specific
estimates of trip time and other factors affecting costs and
trip-making rates. The maglev system analyzed is the U.S.
technology as defined by the NMI, using the operational
performance and cost estimates described in Section 2.4. The
analysis focuses on the baseline scenario using the LS
alignment as defined in Section 3.2, but some information
regarding the favorable scenario and the ES alignment cases is
provided also.

3.3.1 Corridor Financial Feasibility Results

Comparisons of revenue and cost estimates developed for 16
corridors indicate that:

. For the Northeast Corridor (NEC)all costs using a 7 percent
discount rate, and considerably exceed costs with a 4 percent
discount rate.

. For 14 of the 15 other corridors, revenues would cover
operating costs,

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but only a portion of capital costs, using either discount
rate.

. If more favorable assumptions are made, revenues cover all
costs in 2 of the 16 comdors studied using a 7 percent
discount rate, and 6 of the 16 corridors with the 4 percent
discount rate.

. Alternative discount rates and project starting dates can
result in sizable changes to the revenue-cost comparisons.

Figure 3.4A provides estimated corridor revenue-cost (R/C)
ratio information using a 7 percent discount rate for the 16
study corridors on the alignment that uses only LS of existing
ROW. A value of 1.0 indicates a break even condition and the
full bar widths are R/C values for the favorable scenario. The
dark portion of the bar indicates a corridor's R/C value for
the baseline scenario.

The positive financial positions of the NEC under the baseline
scenario and for the California corridor in the favorable
scenario are evident. These estimates also

Notes: (1) Estimates based on present values to year 2000
using a 7 percent discount rate.
(2) Revenues and operating costs estimated for 40 years.
(3) Costs include initial construction, initial vehicles,
and future vehicle replacement and fleet growth.
(4) Corridor alignments based on limited sharing ROW case.

3-10

reveal, however, that 3 corridors have significantly lower
economic performance even under this study's favorable
scenario. Still, as will be seen in later sections, even some
of these corridors can be significant links in a larger maglev
system or network.

The R/C ratios of Figure 3.4A are computed using a discount
rate of 7 percent. A lower discount rate would raise these
values. For example, using a 4 percent discount rate for the
NEC changes its R/C ratio from 1.03 to 1.47 and for the
Dallas-Houston (Dal-Hou) corridor, the ratio changes from 0.48 to
0.72. Results using the 4 percent discount rate for all 16
corridors and both scenarios are provided in Figure 3.4B.

Some corridors might not begin operations until after the year
2000, and this factor would also affect a corridor's estimated
R/C ratio because of higher passenger demand. For example, if
2010 were used as the starting date for the California
corridor, its R/C ratio would increase from 0.55 to 0.69 (7
percent discount rate) or from 0.81 to 1.00 (4 percent
discount rate).

Notes: (1) Estimates based on present values to year 2000
using a 4 percent discount rate.
(2) Revenues and operating costs estimated for 40 years.
(3) Costs include initial construction, initial vehicles,
and future vehicle replacement and fleet growth.
(4) Corridor alignments based on limited sharing ROW case.

3-11

While the R/C ratios summarize the financial performance of
maglev in individual corridors, the dollar value of the
revenue and cost estimates (as discussed below) are also
important to the evaluation of the maglev technology as a
potential intercity transportation system. In particular,
these estimates reflect:

. Very substantial costs involved in building and operating
maglev systems in all corridors.

. High levels of ridership attracted to maglev for many of the
corridors.

These cost and ridership estimates are at the high end, but in
the general range of those used in previous studies of HSGT.

Finally, the analysis in this report, even though it
considered factors particular to specific corridors, was
designed to help reach conclusions about maglev applicability
across the United States. In some cases, more detailed surveys
of potential ridership and more detailed cost analysis of
routes have been undertaken to support decisions on specific
HSGT projects. The analysis in this report should not be
considered a substitute for such studies of particular
geographic areas.

3.3.2 Corridor Costs

The cost estimates used in the overall evaluation of corridor
financial performance are discounted (present value) totals of
all capital and operating costs over 40 years. The key results
in the cost area are:

. Initial capital costs for each corridor are substantial,
ranging from $5.7 billion to $21.4 billion (7 percent discount
rate) or $5.5 billion to $20.5 billion (4 percent discount
rate).

. Technology-driven guideway costs are only about half of the
initial construction cost; costs for vehicles, stations and
other required ancillary facilities, civil reconstruction,
environmental mitigation measures, contingencies, and program
management make up the rest.

. Vehicle fleet costs are large in absolute terms, but only
about 5-10 percent of a system's total capital cost.

. Life cycle operating and maintenance costs are about 10-20
percent of total life cycle costs (20-25 percent with the 4
percent discount rate) and about 9 cents per passenger mile
for most of the study corridors.

The dominant cost category for all corridors is the initial
capital cost of the system. These costs range from $5.7
billion to $21.4 billion (see Table 3.4) with high values
reflecting longer distances and more urban area construction.
The capital cost per mile ranges from $27 million to $46
million, reflecting the variations in construction conditions
among corridors. It is lower per mile than the $50-100 million
per mile cost of urban rail systems, mainly because intercity
systems entail substantial rural (lower cost) mileage and
because they have fewer stations per mile of guideway.

The maglev guideway is a major component of total life cycle
cost, but other cost categories also comprise major portions
of the total. Figure 3.5 shows that

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Notes: (1) Estimates are for baseline scenario using the
limited sharing ROW alignment.
(2) Guideway technology costs include the guideway beam,
supporting structures, and ale electrical and magnetic
components.
(3) Other costs include vehicles, stations and other fixed
facilities, environmental mitigation costs, civil
reconstruction, non-technology site preparation work,
contingencies, and program management.
(4) A construction financing cost is included in these
estimates using the 7 percent real interest rate. A 4
percent rate reduces all table dollar values by 4.2
percent.

3-13

corridor specific information can lead to relatively large
differences in economic results.

The estimates of corridor operating and maintenance costs are
typically about 9 cents per passenger mile with a few low--
volume corridors considerably different than the average (as
high as 37 cents per passenger mile and as low as 7 cents per
passenger mile). These costs are higher than the 3-5 cents
used in some other studies of maglev.

3.3.3 Corridor Ridership and Revenues

Based on the NMI effort, the major conclusions about maglev
ridership and revenues are:

. Diversion rates to maglev are highest for air origin/
destination (OD) and rail passengers.
. The primary source of maglev revenue is from diverted common
carrier, especially air OD, passengers.
. Diversion rates from auto travelers average only 2.1-percent,
but diverted auto trips account for about 7-percent of revenue
because of the large number of auto trips from which
diversions are drawn.
. Corridor ridership and revenues for maglev generally come from
a multiplicity of city pairs and modal markets, often with no
single source accounting for 40 percent of revenues.

3-14

Maglev ridership and revenues arise mainly as a result of
diversions from existing modes, especially air. These
diversions are estimated by applying modal diversion rates to
projected modal trips for each city pair and trip purpose and
multiplying by projected fare levels. The modal diversion
rates are estimated for the auto, rail, air origin/destination
(OD), and air transfer (TR) modes. Table 3.5 summarizes the
corridor diversion rates by mode and gives the range
(reflected by the highest and lowest value from the 16
corridors) and the average value for the 16 study corridors
(Appendix Table A1 contains corridor specific diversion
rates).

The low diversion rates for auto occur because auto travelers
cannot easily be shifted to a new mode that is similar to air
in cost, trip time, and other characteristics. Since auto
travelers have chosen not to use air, few shift to the new
mode which is similar to air, even though it often offers
sizable trip time advantages over the auto.

The diversion rates for rail, air origin/destination (OD) and
air transfer (TR) passengers, unlike auto, can be traced to
the maglev trip time and fare advantages. Generally, if common
carrier passengers are offered a competing service with
similar cost, travel time, and comfort levels, significant
numbers will elect to travel on the new mode. The air transfer
passenger diversion rates are lower than the air OD rates because
these passengers would encounter some extra transfer trip time
and are not assumed to receive a discount in their total trip
cost. The air transfer diversion rates are also low in some
cases because they are treated as zero for metropolitan areas in
which there is no maglev station assumed at an airport.

Maglev revenues are estimated by combining diversion rates
with market size and fares and adding in estimates for induced
travel and short distance markets for which no diversions are
estimated. Table 3.6 summarizes the maglev revenue sources by
corridor.

There are several noteworthy results evident in the Table 3.6
estimates for the study corridors. First, the primary source
of maglev revenues is existing travelers using common carrier
modes, especially air OD travelers. Second, in many corridors,
there are significant secondary markets beyond the air OD
passenger. Specifically, there are only 3 of the 16 study
corridors that obtain as much as two-thirds of their expected
maglev revenues from the air OD market and several obtain
below 50 percent. Significant potential markets for

3-16

Note: Bus trips used instead of rail trips for LA-LV estimate.

intercity HSGT would be missed in any study that focuses only
on air OD trips.

Third, the joint influence of market size and diversion rates
is seen in the estimates of revenues from the rail mode. A
corridor with large numbers of existing rail travelers derives
a large proportion of its maglev revenue from the rail mode
whereas a corridor with little or no rail 3-16 travel does not
(even if the diversion rate is high). Fourth, the revenues from
the auto mode are higher than might be expected given their low
diversion rates. This reflects the large absolute size of the
intercity auto market in the study corridors.

The analysis of maglev financial performance in this study
focuses mainly on corridors rather than individual city

3-16

pairs or complex networks. For most corridors, reported costs
and revenues are summaries for the multiple city pairs that
would be served. Connecting more points tends to enhance the
overall financial performance of a corridor if the extra
distance and circuity are limited. This can be a key
consideration in the planning and design of intercity systems
and in comparisons among modal options.

Table 3.7 serves to illustrate this perspective by providing
sources of estimated maglev passenger miles by category for
the New York State (NYS) corridor. The diversity of ridership in
terms of modal diversions and geographical patterns is clear and
indicates the importance of evaluating all potential ridership
sources for financial analyses. Further, even though air
diversions are usually the largest potential source of maglev
ridership and revenues, focusing on single air OD markets can
seriously understate maglev's potential. Even the biggest market
in the NYS corridor, New York-Buffalo, comprises less than 30-
percent of the total estimated maglev market.

3.3.4 Intercorridor Impacts on Financial Performance

A financial analysis of maglev corridors joined into small
systems or networks was performed with the following results:

. Intercorridor connections can result in modest additions to
maglev ridership and revenues.

. The financial performance of intercorridor systems is somewhat
better than the average achieved by the individual corridors.

. In some cases, the financial performance of an intercorridor
system can be better than any of the corridors considered as
separate units.

Up to this point, demand and cost estimates have been
presented for 16 independent corridors. This section extends
the analysis to corridor networks defined as combinations of
adjacent corridors. Traffic demand on these networks will be
greater than the sum of demand of their component parts due to
new intercorridor demand generated from city pairs with
origins in one corridor and destinations in another. However,
diversion rates to high-speed ground modes might not be as
great for intercorridor trips because trip distances will
generally be longer and some trips might be expected to
involve transfers.

Costs for the combined network are expected to increase much
more modestly. Operating, maintenance, and vehicle costs
should be roughly proportionate to demand, but the capital
costs (the largest component of costs) should increase only
marginally and might actually be lower than the sum for the
separate corridors when corrections are made for duplicate
track and stations at corridor junctions.

Not all connections among the study corridors or other
possible corridors were considered. Thus, the results
presented here are only indicative of likely impacts in this
area. A more comprehensive analysis is needed to estimate the
impacts of larger networks and to reduce the qualifications
and uncertainties in these results.

Two networks were analyzed with procedures similar to those
used for each of the independent corridors (ridership and
revenues were estimated at the OD level using the demand
models). Estimated financial ratios were also developed for
four other networks that use the hub-and-spoke concept,
although the analytical methods used were less detailed. The
networks used in these analyses are displayed in Figure 3.6.

In the more detailed network analysis, maglev service between
city pairs in these combined corridors is assumed to be
similar to that provided in component corridors except for a
20-minute transfer penalty at the major intercorridor
junctions

Results in this section were estimated using the
7-percent discount rate. Whereas a 4-percent discount rate
raises the R/C ratios, the patterns and conclusions are
similar to those reported here. Appendix A, Table A2 contains
network R/C ratio information corresponding to Table 3.8, but
using the 4-percent discount rate.

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of Washington, D.C. and Philadelphia. Train frequency is
assumed to be sufficient to serve the extra demand from the
new city pairs served.

Added intercorridor trips increased total demand by
10.4-percent on the East Coast network and 13.2 percent on the
North Central Network. Revenues increased by a larger amount
(15.1 percent and 18.2 percent) due to the longer average trip
lengths of the added intercorridor trips.

An approximate method was used to develop rough estimates of
the financial impact of joining corridors into networks at
potential hubs as defined in Figure 3.6. The approach employs
relationships developed in analyzing the East Coast and
North Central networks, combined with data on trip potential
derived from forecasts of air and rail intercity travel. The
results of this analysis are presented in Table 3.8. In all
cases, intercorridor travel generated as a consequence of
forming high-speed ground networks at hubs produced a modest
positive impact on the average financial performance estimated
for independent corridors. In particular, the revenue/cost
ratios for the Chicago and Orlando hubs are higher than any of
the R/C ratios of their components.

Using a 7 percent discount rate, the additional value of
intercorridor travel is modest, increasing the average
revenue/ cost (R/C) ratio by 0.07 (East Coast) and 0.08 (North
Central). If all intercorridor

3-19

Note: Estimates based on 7 percent discount rate.

revenues and costs were attributed to the corridors combined
with the NEC (an incremental analysis), the R/C ratio for the
SEC would rise from 0.40 to 0.59 and the R/C ratio for the
combination of the Pennsylvania and Chicago-Pittsburgh
corridors would rise from an average of 0.29 to 0.44. Although
corridors with lower initial financial performance are
enhanced by network effects, such corridors reduce the overall
viability of the extended network. The R/C levels and size of
the changes are increased when a 4 percent discount rate is
used.

While this analysis shows that some enhancement in economic
performance is possible by forming networks, the cost of an
extensive network and the marginal performance of some network
additions, despite the enhancement, would still make the
implementation of large-scale networks questionable.

3.3.5 Effect of Alignment on Financial Performance

Two hybrid alignments were considered for each study corridor:

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. An alignment with ES of existing highway and rail ROW.

. An alignment that, while involving LS of some highway and rail
ROW mainly in urban areas, is built on mainly new ROW in rural
areas.

While the operational and financial performance estimates of
the USML system on the two alignments are similar (in part
because the alignments are hybrids), there are consistent
differences. In particular:

. Extensive ROW sharing alignments tend to be inferior to the
LS alignments in ridership, cost, and overall financial
performance.

Table 3.9 provides estimates of corridor ridership density and
revenue-cost ratios for the baseline scenarios on both types
of alignments for both the 7 percent and 4 percent discount
rates. These results reflect the lower ridership levels and
the cost disadvantage for the alignments with ES of existing
ROW because of longer distances and overall higher costs per
mile that usually occur.

3.3.6 Financial Potential of Maglev in Other Corridors

Ten of the 26 corridors originally chosen for study were not
subjected to detailed analysis of trips diverted to maglev.
Nevertheless, it is possible to approximate the financial
performance of these 10 in relation to that of the other 16 by
ranking all 26 according to O/D air traffic density (passenger
miles per route mile) and seeing where the 10 rank in relation
to the 16. This is the case because, as shown in Table 3.10,
there is rough correlation between a ranking by air traffic
density and a ranking by either projected maglev traffic density
or revenue/cost ratio. From this analysis, it is evident that
the corridors with highest potential are among the 16 studied in
detail. The other 10 corridors do not appear to be among the
financially stronger candidates for the implementation of
maglev, though some of these corridors, or still others, may
provide more potential as extensions to or connections within a
network because of intercorridor trip making.

3.4 PUBLIC BENEFITS OF MAGLEV

The economic evaluation of maglev should include not only its
financial viability but also its other public benefits and
costs in areas such as congestion, petroleum consumption,
emission, and safety. The estimated values of such public
benefits and costs can, at least conceptually, be added to the
corridor revenues and used to compute a societal benefit/cost
(BC) ratio. There are also macroeconomic and other impacts of
maglev that are identified but not included in the BC
accounting; these are discussed in Section 3.5.

3.4.1 Airport Congestion Relief Benefit

Analysis of airport congestion relief indicated that:

. Passengers diverted to maglev from air reduce demand and
congestion at airports.

. The congestion reduction benefit is received by remaining air
passengers, i.e., airport users.

3-21

. The congestion benefit at New York City area airports, is
estimated to be $45 million a year from the NEC maglev.

. Maglev would have a sizable congestion relief benefit when
aggregated over many cities, corridors, and years.

3-22

Notes: (1) Revenue-Cost ratio data based on life cycle present
value estimates using a 7 percent discount rate (see
Figure 3.4)
(2) Air and maglev passenger data are for year 2020.
(3) Air passenger data are OD only (no transfer
passengers included).

3-23

Diversion of air traffic to HSGT modes will potentially reduce
delays at congested airports. Although this benefit may be
reduced by having new flights at popular departure times,
having more air travelers, or by canceling or postponing
airport/air traffic control improvements, the direct
congestion reduction benefit can still be a good first
approximation of the size of estimated benefit. However, the
estimate is highly dependent on the assumptions that are made
about airport capacity increases during the period of
analysis.

Table 3.11 presents what is probably a very conservative
order-of magnitude estimate of the airport congestion relief
benefit for three of the larger cities (New York, Chicago, and
Los Angeles) along potential maglev corridors. The first two
rows of Table 3.11 give enplanement totals for 1988 and 2020.
These data are for Chicago O'Hare, the three large New York
airports (JFK, EWR, and LGA), and the four greater Los Angeles
airports (LAX, SNA, BUR, and ONT).

The third row shows the percentages of projected 2020
enplanements diverted to a USML system for various proposed
corridors involving the cities of New York, Chicago, and Los
Angeles on LS alignments. Although the estimated percentages
would be larger if several corridors were built reaching each
city and intercorridor traffic were permitted, the combined
corridor total diversion percentage does not include this
intercorridor effect.

The fourth and fifth rows present estimates of the airport
delay and delay reduction in the three cities. The 1988 delay
per operation, in minutes, is the average for air carriers
reporting this information in that year to the FAA. The delay
reduction in 2020, in minutes, assumes that: (1) in the
absence of maglev, changes would take place to keep 2020 delay
at 1988 levels and (2) a given percentage diversion of
enplanements will lead to the same reduction in delay per
operation.

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Also, the calculated dollar benefits in the sixth row of Table
3.11 apply the reduction to the nondiverted air passengers,
valuing their time at the $39.50 per hour rate recommended by
the FAA for such analysis.

Finally, the 2020 delay reduction benefits to remaining air
passengers are compared to corridor net revenues in the
seventh row of Table 3.11. These rough estimates indicate that
societal benefits in the form of reduced airport congestion
should be considered in the overall evaluation of a maglev
development program and that improved estimates of these
benefits would be of value.

Another way of thinking about congestion relief benefits is in
terms of the cost of public facilities that would not have to
be built as a result of building a maglev line. Specifically,
we can deduce from Table 3.11 that, in the metropolitan areas
shown, about 11 to 17 percent of projected total enplanements
in these areas to all destinations in 2020 would be diverted
by maglev. This is the equivalent of 22 to 30-percent of the
projected increase in enplanements between 1988 and 2020.
Thus, airport authorities intent on holding down future
increases in delay would not have to build 22 to 30 percent of
the new capacity otherwise needed. If this is replicated in
other airports in the corridors, it is easy to see how it
could represent several billion dollars of public benefit
value in each corridor.

3.4.2 Impacts on Petroleum Usage, Emissions, and Safety

The NMI energy, emission, and safety impact analysis
indicates:

. The petroleum savings from maglev, which uses electricity
generated from nonpetroleum fuels, is a result primarily of
diverting passengers from the airlines to maglev.

. The lower petroleum consumption for moving these passengers
reduces the emission levels of carbon dioxide and most noxious
gases.

. Maglev will result in net reductions in injuries and
fatalities, primarily because of diversions from auto
traffic..

The diversion of intercity trips from air, auto, and rail
modes to maglev results in net reductions in energy usage,
petroleum consumption, emissions of most airborne pollutants,
and lives lost in accidents. The size and value of these
impacts depend on the ridership estimates for each corridor.
Estimates of these effects are summarized in Section 4.3.3
where they are considered along with an analysis of variations
among technologies.

3.5 OTHER NATIONAL IMPACTS OF MAGLEV

The decision to pursue the development of maglev as an
intercity passenger system depends mainly on its potential
role as a new transportation mode, i.e., its technical and
economic soundness. Maglev development can also, however, be
viewed as a part of a broader strategic plan for United States
economic development, and it is in this context that its
national impacts are relevant. Strategic economic goals of job
creation, technological advancement, and international
competitiveness would be enhanced by the development and
building of maglev systems. The following sections

3-25

describe these potential national impacts of maglev.

3.5.1 Employment Implications

The development and implementation of maglev systems will
cause jobs to be created in various industries, beginning with
the engineering community that will design it, followed by the
construction industry that will build it, and ending with the
eventual operators that will operate and maintain it. The
activities, types and number of jobs, and business
opportunities will differ in each phase of implementation.

During the design phase, technical firms will propose a
combination of components and subsystems integrated into a
total system concept which includes a vehicle and guideway
associated structure. Following design, components must be
manufactured and constructed and tested as subsystems and
ultimately integrated and evaluated as an operating system.
The funds required for this engineering development program
are estimated to be about $800 million and would support about
15,500 person-years of direct and secondary effort if a new
system is developed in the United States. Lesser amounts of
these funds would be spent here if the system is co-developed
with Japan and very little would be spent here if the German
system is chosen.

After the development phase is completed, an operational
corridor might be constructed. The Northeast Corridor is
selected to provide an example of the numbers and types of
jobs to be expected. Construction of an operational maglev
system extending from Washington, D.C. to Boston would require
large amounts of labor. One hundred seventy-two thousand direct
person-years of effort required were estimated on the basis of
industry-specific statistical data for the value of outputs
per employee. This estimate of direct effort, however, does
not include the labor required to produce the materials and
purchased parts passed through in the costs. An additional
180,000 person years, estimated on the basis of value added
per employee, would be required in secondary jobs. After the
Northeast Corridor system is operational, employees would be
required to operate and maintain the system as well as to
provide services to the passengers. In summary, a maglev
technology development program and any consequent
implementation of maglev systems in revenue service would
create jobs. The extent to which these would be net new jobs
rather than shifts from other economic activities depends on
whether the economy is operating at full employment and on how
the development and implementation are financed. Also, to the
extent that these services are those that would have been
provided to passengers traveling by an alternative mode, they
are a transfer from one mode to another and will have little
effect on total employment in the economy. Of possibly equal
importance in terms of national impact is whether these jobs
represent skills that improve the United States' ability to
compete in the international marketplace and whether the
technology spins off new applications that have similar
effects. These are the subjects of the next two sections.

3.5.2 Technological Advancement and Spinoffs

Maglev systems feature new, innovative technological content
when compared to

3-26

existing transportation systems. As noted in Section 2.2, each
of the United States conceptual system designs has a different
approach to meeting the levitation, propulsion, guidance, and
power transfer requirements for a high-speed magnetic
levitation system. As the engineering designs in these areas
are refined, technical advances with spinoff implications to
other products and industries are likely.

Areas in which maglev technical development will be focused
include:

. Magnetics-High temperature superconductivity, cryogenics, low
temperature refrigerators, and superconducting magnet design
and construction.

. Materials-Fiber reinforced plastics for vehicles and
structural concretes.

. Electronics-Communication and high power solid state controls.

. Engineering-Vehicle design (aerodynamics and noise
mitigation), precision manufacturing, construction and
fabrication of concrete structures.

Possible advances and spinoffs in these areas are identified
in the discussion below of innovations related to key maglev
system components.

Guideways

To achieve the dynamic behavior and construction tolerances of
the concrete structures, it will be necessary to develop new
manufacturing techniques and facilities analogous to those
developed in

Germany for this purpose. New methods which could be used
immediately in conventional civil construction projects for
installing the system along existing highways with minimal
disruption will be required. The use of nonconducting,
nonmagnetic polymer reinforcing materials in concrete might
have the potential for extending the life of concrete
structures. If successful, these materials will significantly
reduce the life cycle cost when used in the renovation of
highways and bridges. Expansion of the fiber reinforced
plastics industry would likely result in cost reductions and
greater utilization of these materials in other applications.
The guideway might also incorporate devices to assure that it
is not obstructed by debris, or damaged by accidents or
earthquakes, the latter being an important consideration in
the United States, but only a minor consideration in Europe.

Power Equipment

The power equipment used between the transmission line and the
guideway will differ for each system and must be developed. In
one proposed system, the power conditioning is performed at
the location of each coil in the guideway, requiring thousands
of high-power solid state power control devices. In another,
the tide quality of the vehicle is controlled, in part, by
dynamically varying the phase of the power to the motor,
requiring the development of high-power control systems to
achieve this objective. Each of these components present
opportunities for the development of similar systems for
automated manufacturing and other purposes.

3-27

Vehicles

The vehicles will be constructed of aluminum or fiber
reinforced plastic structures and will contain superconducting
magnets, cryogenic systems, and high speed, highly reliable
local, regional, and central communications and control systems.
Maglev has stimulated a reexamination of passenger comfort
and environment requirements, and means of achieving them, that
will carry over directly to other transportation modes. Means
of ensuring minimal environmental impacts from routing,
magnetic exposure, noise, and air pollution are being
investigated that will influence our use of petroleum and
electrical energy and livability of our cities and countryside.
These considerations will have long-lasting effects on our
lifestyles.

Magnets

Superconducting magnets are used for many purposes, but seldom
in applications where lives depend on their operation or in
transportation applications where they are subject to the
vibrations expected in maglev systems. The development of
vibration insensitive magnets might be of use in transportable
magnetic resonance imaging systems, military magneto-
hydrodynamic systems for ship propulsion and other mobile
applications. Magnets that fail in a more controlled manner
might also be expected, permitting safer operation of the
system. Credible designs have already been proposed for
systems using supercritical, rather than liquid, helium as the
refrigerant, with a significant increase in power efficiency of
the cryogenic system. The United States and other countries
have devoted major efforts to the development of high-
temperature superconductor operating at temperature above 77
degree Kelvin, and one proposed system design might be capable
of using such conductors as they currently exist. Such
magnets in a Magellan system would effectively eliminate the
concerns for cryogenic refrigeration abroad the vehicle. A
dedicated Magellan program could provide the impetus to further
develop these magnets which have numerous projected uses for
medical applications, shielding of magnetic fields, electric
motors, oil exploration, magnetic separation of materials, and
superconducting magnetic energy storage.

Summary

High technology business will be quick to capitalize on
spin-offs that occur as maglev technology evolves. Of
particular economic value could be the early implementation of
fiber reinforced polymers in concrete structures, vibration
insensitive superconducting magnets, and ruggedized cryogenic
and refrigeration systems for ship propulsion and other mobile
uses. Also of value could be higher power solid state devices
for controlling motors in heavy industry, and linear
synchronous motors for use in conveyors and manufacturing
operations requiring precise control.

3.5.3 International Competitiveness

Developing high-speed Magellan technology can contribute to the
international competitiveness of the United States in two ways.
First, the design and development effort will likely lead to
technical advances and spinoffs as discussed in the previous
section. Some of these advances and spinoffs will enhance U.S.
productivity, and others will spawn new industries and

3-28

products that could become future export industries.

Second, while the prospects for maglev implementation in the
U.S. and other countries are still uncertain, it is in the
national interest that U.S. systems be prime candidates for
selection if maglev becomes an important mode of travel. The
direct effects on the balance of payments anytime a U.S.
system is selected is one obvious reason. It is also important
to create high quality and high paying job opportunities for
the well-educated United States work force. As noted earlier
in this Chapter, the initial capital costs involved in building
a maglev system would be about $21 billion for the NEC and
generally between $5 billion and $21 billion for other corridors
studied. It is estimated that about 63 percent of these
expenditures would be for components produced by high technology
industries. The other major initial expenditure is from the
relatively wells-killed civil construction industry. Further,
the replacement parts industries supporting an operating maglev
system would provide on-going skilled employment opportunities.

3-29

Chapter 4: Comparisons of U.S. Maglev with Existing
HSGT Systems-Transrapid (TR07) and TGV

4.1 OVERVIEW

The previous chapter examined the economic performance of a
U.S. Maglev system in a number of intercity travel markets.
This chapter compares that performance with the economic
performance of existing HSGT technologies, assuming they were
implemented instead of a USML system in the same markets. It
seeks to answer the question. "Would a USML be better in U.S.
applications than either TR07 or TGV-type technology, and
would it be worth the additional development cost to make the
new technology available?"

The short answer to these questions is that, at a 7 percent
discount rate, a U.S. Maglev system would offer better
financial performance than TR07 in all of the corridors
studied, and offer equal or better performance than TGV in all
corridors but one (Florida) when measured in terms of revenue
to cost ratio. If a 4 percent discount rate were assumed, the
financial ratio would favor U.S. Maglev by wider margins. The
magnitude of the financial differences among technologies is
highly dependent on the discount rate assumption because of
significant differences in projected capital outlays and net
revenues over time. Maglev systems are expected to require
larger initial capital outlays, but are also expected to
generate much greater revenues net of operating expenses once
the systems are in full operation.

Finally, in making these comparisons, it must be kept in mind
that the cost estimates for existing technologies, TGV
and, to a lesser extent TR07, are derived from operating and
construction experience, while the USML costs are only
engineering estimates.

4.2 ANALYTICAL APPROACH AND METHODS

The approach used in this chapter parallels that of Chapter 3.
Section 3.2 describes the process used in projecting travel by
competing modes for origin/destination pairs, estimating the
diversion from those modes and the resulting revenue,
estimating the capital and operating costs and, finally,
estimating the public benefits. In this chapter, a nearly
identical process will be used to make the same estimates with
regard to TR07 and, separately, TGV systems that could be
built in each of those corridors. Once this is done, a number
of comparisons will be made between various performance
measures for USML versus the same performance measures for
existing technologies. The remainder of this section
highlights only the differences in methods regarding TR07 and
TGV analysis versus those used regarding USML.

At this point in the analysis process, projections of
high-speed ground system costs, ridership, and revenues are
preliminary, and will need to be revised once a system, suited
for U.S. operation, is fully designed and specified. Although
NMI cost estimates were developed in ways that compensated for
most cost understatement problems common in other
transportation projects, costs for a U.S. Maglev system (a
conceptual design)

4-1

should be considered more uncertain than the costs of TGV
(deployed in Europe) and TR07 (running on a test track).

With regard to the TR07, the identical alignments were
considered as with USML; i.e., both an alignment with
extensive sharing (ES) and limited sharing (LS) of existing
highway and rail right(s)of-way (ROW), primarily in urban
areas. However, for TGV, only the LS alignment (identical to
Maglev except where maximum TGV grade capability would be
exceeded) was used. Unlike the analysis of USML, only one
socioeconomic scenario, the "baseline," was used for TR07 and
TGV.

The same demand model was used to estimate ridership and
revenue for TR07 and TGV but the different, generally longer,
trip times associated with these technologies resulted in
lower estimates of diverted trips and consequently lower
revenues than with USML. While the same general structure was
used for the cost estimating model, different parameters and
assumptions were used for TR07 and TGV because of the
different cost characteristics inherent in their respective
technologies relative to USML.

4.3 ECONOMIC COMPARISON OF HSGT TECHNOLOGY OPTIONS

In this section, German Maglev (TR07) and TGV/HSR technologies
are compared to the USML in terms of travel time and financial
performance for the same 16 corridors studied in Chapter 3.
The operational performance and cost assumptions used to assess
each technology are described in Section 2.4.

4.3.1 Sources of Economic Differences

Economic differences in demand and cost among the high-speed
ground technologies are based on variations in their inherent
technological characteristics (i.e., banking, acceleration,
and vehicle and consist size/ seating). These technology
distinctions are translated into differences in line haul
travel time and speed profiles along corridor alignments,
train frequencies, fares, operating costs, and capital costs.

Average total vehicle trip times (line haul, access/egress,
and terminal time) by distance block between all city pairs
represented in the 16 corridors are summarized in Figure 4.1.
Additional estimates of corridor trip times and average speeds
are provided in Table AS of Appendix A. Major conclusions are:

. Travel time for the USML technology is lowest at each
distance, followed closely by TR07. Both maglev technologies
enjoy a significant speed advantage relative to TGV.'
. Although such details are not displayed in Figure 4.1, the
pattern of trip time differences favoring USML is accentuated
on the more highly curved alignments using ES of existing ROW.

The fares assumed for high-speed ground technologies are
calculated as a percent of air fare to approximately maximize
the net

In order to maximize TGV performance, the 200 mph Texas
TGV was used for calculations of trip times.

4-2

revenue (revenue minus variable costs) that could be generated
on each system. Higher fares produce more revenue up to the
point where reductions in passenger demand offset the gains in
per passenger yield. The more competitive a HSGT mode is with
air on travel time, the higher the net revenue maximizing fare
that can be set. Because both maglev technologies enjoy
significant speed advantages over TGV, their fare levels are
set at the highest fraction of competing air fares. The fares
used in this analysis for distances up to 400 miles are shown
in Table 4.1. Fares are assumed to decline to Ys of these levels
at distances greater than 600 miles.

4-3

The three HSGT technologies are also distinguished on the
basis of operating and capital costs. Emphasis was placed on
developing detailed cost estimates for the U.S. and TR07
Maglev systems; a more limited analysis was performed on TGV
costs based primarily on published data.

In Table 4.2, data are presented for each of the technologies
on initial capital

Notes: (1) Estimates are for baseline scenario using the
limited sharing ROW alignment.
(2) Guideway technology costs include the guideway beam,
supporting structures, and all electrical and
magnetic components.
(3) Other costs include: vehicles, stations, other fixed
facilities, environmental mitigation costs, civil
reconstruction, nontechnology site preparation work,
contingencies, and program management.
(4) A construction financing cost is included in these
estimates using the 7 percent real interest rate.

4-4

requirements for guideways and other capital expenditures,
including vehicles, civil reconstruction, project management
and contingencies. These data are calculated at the 7 percent
discount rate, but would be only slightly smaller if
calculated using the 4 percent discount rate assumption. For
example, the initial capital cost for USML in the NEC is $21.2
billion at 7 percent, as compared to $20.3 billion at 4
percent. (See Table A4 in Appendix A.)

The per mile technology cost comparisons are given in Section
2.4 for elevated and at-grade construction. Vehicle purchase
and some fixed capital cost estimates are adjusted to reflect
differences in the ridership estimates for the three
technologies. Energy consumption rates and vehicle operating
costs also differ between maglev and TGV.

4.3.2 Comparisons of Corridor Financial Performance

The combination of travel times and fares results in a clear
advantage for USML in attracting passengers. As can be seen in
Figure 4.2:

. USML has significantly more ridership relative to the two
other HSGT technologies. When averaged over the 16 corridors,
on the LS alignment, passenger-miles per route-mile in 2020 is
4.6 percent higher for USML than TR07 and 28.5 percent higher
relative to TGV.

Additional data on corridor trip levels, passenger miles,
and passenger diversion rates are provided in Tables A1 and AS
of Appendix A.

4-5

. On the ES alignment, the advantage of USML over other
technologies is even greater.

Tables 4.3 and 4.4 portray, for the three technologies,
revenue-to-cost ratios and operating recovery ratios for 7
percent and 4 percent discount rates. At both discount

The operating recovery ratio is defined as the present
value of revenues divided by the present value of O&M costs.

4-6

rates, USML is projected to have substantially higher revenues
and consequently, operating recovery ratios than the other
technologies. However, USML has only a small advantage over
TGV in terms of overall revenue/cost ratio because projected
capital outlays for USML are considerably greater. All
revenue-to-cost ratios are considerably lower at the 7 percent
discount rate. Although the present values of initial capital
costs are similar at different discount rates, the present
value of the stream of revenues and O&M costs over time vary
significantly with the discount rate assumption

4-7

Notes: (1) Percent difference computed from sum of data over
all 16 corridors.
(2) Baseline scenario, 7 percent discount rate.

Tables 4.5 and 4.6 show that the differences between USML and
TR07 are greatest on the ES alignment, where constraints limit
elimination of curves along the route, accentuating travel
time differences between the technologies. In addition, both
U.S. and German Maglev technologies compare favorably to the
TGV on the LS alignment. These results hold for both the 7
percent (shown) and 4 percent discount rate assumptions.

In Table 4.7, estimates are presented of operating costs,
revenues, and operating surplus for a typical year, 2020.
These financial measures are identical at the 7 percent and 4
percent discount rates. An operating surplus is anticipated
for all

4-8

corridors and each technology except for Seattle-Portland. The
operating surplus is greatest for the USML and TR07
technologies. Although TGV is estimated to have lower O&M
costs, its 2020 projected revenues are considerably smaller
than USML and, to a lesser extent, TR07.

In Section 3.3.4, the effects of intercorridor travel on
Maglev (USML on the LS alignment) financial performance were
estimated. Table 4.8 presents the results of this analysis for
the TGV technology in the East Coast HSGT network at the 7
percent discount rate (similar results occur at the 4 percent
discount rate). Major findings indicate that:

. Relative to air, average intercorridor HSGT trips are
expected to have longer

4-9

Notes: (1) East Coast corridor is combination of Northeast
(Boston to Washington) and Southeast (Washington to
Atlanta).
(2) Baseline scenario, 7 percent discount rate, and
limited sharing alignment for both technologies.

travel times than within corridor trips, resulting in lower
average diversion rates.

. Intercorridor diversions for TR07 and TGV (on either
alignment) will be smaller than for USML.

. Intercorridor travel will improve the financial performance of
TR07 and TGV to a lesser degree than for USML. The network
effect on the TGV revenue/cost ratio is only about 60 percent
of the network effect attributable to combining corridors for
the USML case.

The net financial assistance required to build HSGT systems in
each of the corridors is estimated in Figures 4.3 (total) and
4.4 (amortized per passenger-mile). Estimates are calculated
in terms of present value at 7 percent for the LS alignment;
projected net financial assistance at lower discount rates
would be substantially lower because of the higher present
value of net revenues available to offset capital cost. For ES
alignments financial assistance would be greater because of
lower present value of net revenues. Additional data on
corridor ticket prices, passenger costs, and required
subsidies (financial assistance) using both the 4 percent and
7 percent discount rates are provided in Tables A6, A7, As,
and A9 of Appendix A.

Results show that:

. At the 7 percent discount rate, total financial assistance is
the least for TGV in all corridors except for the NEC where
both systems show small surpluses. Financial assistance
requirements are reduced at the 4 percent discount rate;
however, the pattern favoring TGV is maintained in all
corridors, but the NEC, California, and LA-Phoenix where USML
has the lowest estimated financial assistance requirements.
In the NEC the surplus for maglev is higher than TGV.

. USML will likely have lower public funding requirements than
TR07 because its construction costs are lower and because the
U.S. technology is expected to generate more ridership and
revenue.

4-10

4-11

4.3.3 Public Benefit Comparisons

In addition to revenue and cost issues associated with a major
public investment in transportation infrastructure, there are
significant benefits and costs in externalities that are not
always captured in the marketplace. Chief among these
externalities are energy use, dependence on petroleum imports,
emissions, and public safety.

The congestion benefits for the USML system, as presented in
Section 3.3, are based on the passenger diversion from the air
mode. With respect to the other HSGT technologies:

. The lower diversions for the TR07 and TGV systems, relative to
the USML, result in lower congestion benefits that are
approximately proportional to the reduced ridership.

. Congestion benefits for TGV are the lowest, estimated to be
about 70 percent of the benefit of USML.

. Higher diversion rates for both maglev systems result in
larger petroleum use benefits relative to the TGV technology
option.

. Some emission savings for TGV are the largest due to its
significantly lower energy intensity per seat-mile and
despite its much lower estimated ridership.

Petroleum Savings

Significant fuel efficiency improvements in light-duty
vehicles have curtailed the growth in energy use by
automobiles and light trucks. The energy use by commercial
modes is expected to exceed that of personal vehicles by the
year 2005. Even with expected efficiency improvements, air
transport is expected to continue to account for about 30
percent of the commercial transportation energy use. Diversion
of air traffic to maglev or high-speed rail (HSR) not only has
potential to improve overall energy efficiency of intercity
travel, but can change the fuel mix from jet fuel (petroleum)
to electricity (almost entirely non-petroleum).

Figure 4.5 presents information on the energy intensity,
measured in BTU per seat-mile, of intercity transportation
modes in 2020 for typical non-stop trips of varying lengths.
Energy intensities are measured at the point of production of
component fuels and include factors for losses due to
refining, domestic transport, electric generation, and
conversion.

Although there are technical differences between the USML
concept and the current TR07 prototype design, especially with
regard to improved aerodynamics and efficiencies in the linear
synchronous motor (LSM) and power conditioning equipment, no
overall energy efficiency differential can reliably be
attributed to these future systems in revenue service.
Therefore, for purposes of calculating energy and emissions
impacts, all maglev designs are considered equivalent. Maglev
is more efficient than the Boeing 737 (Series 300), which is
among the most energy-efficient, short-haul aircraft in
current service. The TGV train, despite its reliance on the
less efficient steel-wheel-on-rail design, is estimated to be
significantly more energy-efficient per seat-mile than maglev
due primarily to its slower top speed (200 versus 300 mph) and
its longer train length (ten-car consist versus two-car
consist).

4-12

Analyses of maglev and TGV operations in 16 corridors were
carried out in order to obtain estimates of petroleum and net
emissions savings resulting from the diversion of passengers
from conventional to high-speed ground technologies. Energy use
and emissions generation are impacted by corridor
characteristics and differences due to vehicle and system
design. These are reflected in differences in passenger miles
of travel and energy intensity for each corridor and technology
alternative. Total petroleum savings, over 16 corridors
for the year 2020, are 21 million barrels for maglev and 15
million barrels for the TGV. The lower number for TGV is a
consequence of fewer passengers being diverted from the air
mode by this technology. The energy calculations assume the
average fleet aircraft efficiency in 2020 for domestic
short-haul service will be equivalent to the current energy
efficiency of the Boeing 737; automobiles will become more
fuel efficient than current vehicles (average 36.7 mpg); and
conventional rail service will improve by introducing higher
efficiency technology and increasing vehicle utilization from
current levels.

The alignments that use LS of existing ROW have higher
petroleum savings than those using ES of existing ROW, and the
maglev technology has higher savings than

Only 14 of the 16 study corridors were considered for the
analysis in this section because the other 2 corridors,
Chicago-Detroit and Dallas-Houston, are included as parts of
the first 14.

4-13

the TGV. In corridors where most of the ridershipis diverted
from aircraft, maglev's potential petroleum savings tend to be
the greatest. In corridors where HSGT routes are circuitous
relative to air routes, energy savings are minimized. Overall,
the total petroleum saved for these 16 corridors represents
the equivalent of several days imported petroleum.

Reductions in Pollutant Emissions

In 1991, there were 74 million people in the United States
residing in counties that were not in compliance with national
ambient air quality standards. Ozone and carbon monoxide
levels have the highest degrees of non-attainment, while
sulfur dioxide has the lowest.

By substituting maglev vehicles for aircraft, diesel electric
locomotive-drawn trains, and highway vehicles, emissions from
these mobile sources are replaced by emissions from electric
generating plants. Since the mix of primary energy sources
varies widely across the United States only the national
picture is considered. Using DOE's reference case, the
nationwide primary energy sources for electricity
generation in the year 2010 are projected to be: 52.3 percent
coal, 17.5 percent natural gas, 16.5 percent nuclear, 5.2
percent oil, and 8.6 percent other (generally considered to be
renewable sources such as hydra, wind, solar, etc.).

Table 4.9 shows the net average percent reduction in emissions
in 16 corridors from intercity passenger travel of greater
than 85 miles. All pollutants, except sulphur oxides, show
sizable reductions due to the introduction of high-speed
ground transportation. Despite its much lower estimated
ridership, some emissions savings for TGV are the greatest due
to its significantly lower energy intensity per seat-mile.

The dollar-equivalent benefit of reducing emissions in a
particular region depends on the level of severity of
non-attainment of that region and the avoided cost of
controlling those emissions. The costs of reducing HC, NO,
and CO are based on estimates of the cost of needed emission
control equipment, while the cost of reducing SO is based on
the value of pollution credits on the Chicago Commodity
Market.

Increasing the Efficiency and Effectiveness of Environmental
Decisions: Benefit-Cost Analysis and Efficient Fees -
A Critical Review," L. Lave and H. Gruenspecht, May, 1991.

"Electricity" Electricity Committee Report, California
Energy Commission, November, 1992. (Contact Joseph Diamond).

4-14

Table 4.10 shows the average annual dollar benefit of reducing
emissions due to the introduction of maglev on the LS
alignment. There is a net positive benefit for all pollutants
except SO; it increases due to the large percentage of coal
projected to be used to generate electricity.

Safety Benefits

Given the well-recognized importance of maintaining high
levels of safety and reliability on any new high-speed ground
system, it is appropriate to assume that it could be operated
with a safety record equally as good as the best existing
intercity modes, i.e., scheduled air and rail. In fact, a
significant benefit of maglev compared with conventional rail
is that all guideway will be grade separated, eliminating
grade-crossing accidents which account for about half of the
fatalities involving intercity U.S. passenger rail.

Potential deleterious effects of electromagnetic fields (EMF),
though considered minor for maglev, will be evaluated more
extensively in further technical studies.

Based on data from the 1992 National Transportation
Statistics, the rate of fatalities involving passenger cars
and taxis has risen slowly in recent years, reaching 1.11 per
10 passenger miles traveled (PMT) in 1990. For accidents
involving intercity passenger trains, the average fatality
rate including grade crossing accidents since 1985 is about
0.54 per 10 PMT. For scheduled commercial flights, the
fatality rate averaged over the period 1985 to 1990, was about
0.08 per 10 PMT. The high-speed ground fatality rate is
assumed to be the same as for air travel.

To the extent that passengers are diverted from other modes to
maglev, their chances of being involved in a fatal accident
are reduced. For the 16 corridors studied, the estimated lives
saved on each mode due to diversions from auto, air, and rail
to maglev are given in Table 4.11. The figures under the USML
column are estimates of fatalities on the USML system if
implemented in 16 corridors.

4-15

Chapter 5: Options For Acquiring Maglev Technology

5.1 INTRODUCTION

Previous chapters have shown that a potential exists in the
United States for using HSGT in high density corridors as an
alternative to existing intercity transportation modes (air,
auto, conventional train) and that maglev systems offer
advantages over high-speed rail in certain of these corridors.
The issue then arises as to how best to introduce maglev
technology into the U.S. transportation system. Three basic
options exist, each dictating different roles and
responsibilities for both the Federal Government and the
private sector and also different technological and economic
impacts. These options are identified and described below.

5.2 DESCRIPTION OF OPTIONS

The three basic options are:

. Reliance on existing foreign technology.

. Improvement upon existing technology through joint venture
with a foreign maglev system developer.

. Development of a USML system.

5.2.1 Reliance on Existing Foreign Technology

This is the status quo option and represents a typical supply
versus demand environment wherein local and regional
transportation demands are being addressed by existing private
sector supply. In the case of maglev systems, existing supply
today is very limited to the extent that only the German TR07
system is of sufficient technical maturity to be considered
for deployment in the United States at this time. For the past
several years, interest in HSGT systems has been at a high
level, particularly in maglev systems, which have been
proposed in the states of California, Nevada, Texas, Florida,
and Pennsylvania. In all of these cases, the interest in HSGT
systems originated in the local area without any market
stimulus or role from the Federal Government.

An example of this option, where the Federal Government does
play a role, is the planned maglev system in Orlando, Florida
that would operate between the airport and a point near Disney
World. Maglev Transit, Inc., a private sector group, is the
franchisee for the project which is designed to address a
local need of transporting a high flow of tourists between two
points. The proposed project uses existing technology, i.e.,
the German Transrapid system, which was developed completely
with German funding. The Intermodal Surface Transportation
Efficiency Act (ISTEA) of 1991 awarded the project $97.5
million which is to be used by the franchisee for ROW
acquisition and site-specific guideway design and
construction. Aside from this funding, the only Federal
involvement in this deployment is the significant role of
safety assurance, i.e., developing safety standards for the
system and assuring that the design and operation of the
system meets these standards. The Federal Government also has
an oversight role in the environmental impact assessment now
in preparation.

5-1

5.2.2 Improvement on Existing Technology Through Joint
Venture with Foreign Maglev System Developer

For the purpose of this study, joint ventures can be
characterized as cooperative efforts between foreign and
American firms for the introduction of maglev systems into the
United States. Joint ventures could take the form of
government-to-government ventures or industry-to-industry or
some combination thereof.

In contrast to the "existing technology option," the joint
venture option is characterized by a general objective to
develop an improvement in the technology, whether it be
performance-, cost-, or safety-based, so that the resultant
system meets U.S. requirements through a shared development
program. Since Germany and Japan are the only countries with
running prototype systems, the joint venture process would use
either the Japanese or German maglev systems as a baseline and
then improve on it with U.S. industry participation.

In theory, joint ventures such as this should prove beneficial
to both parties. For example, the United States could provide
its expertise, primarily at the component and subsystem level
and also its first-hand knowledge about the U.S.
transportation market and environment. Also, the U.S. industry
would naturally obtain engineering experience and technical
knowledge to build a better system. Foreign industry, in turn,
would bring to the venture their system-level expertise in
maglev technology and gain an easier entry into the American
market. Thus, both partners would benefit from the joint
venture.

There are, however, two serious practical issues that must be
resolved before a joint venture could work; simply, who does
the work and who pays for it. For example, developing
improvements to the German Transrapid (TR07) system to meet
U.S. specifications (i.e., better acceleration/ deceleration
and vehicle tilt capability) would require significant effort
and funding. Most likely, to limit redevelopment time and
costs, the developer would prefer to perform the necessary
redesign and testing with experienced staff in Germany. (It is
highly unlikely in the short run that the joint venture
partners would fund and build facilities in the United States
that duplicate those in Emsland, Germany.) The German side may
question the need for further development since its key focus
has been to penetrate the U.S. market with existing
technology. Private investors on both sides would probably
balk at putting money into a development program because of
the length of time before realizing a return on their
investment.

The degree to which the German Government would fund further
TR07 development on behalf of an American joint venture
partner is debatable. The advisability of the U.S. Government
providing funds for the further development of a German or
Japanese or any other foreign system, which could compete with
American firms interested in pursuing maglev development,
would depend on the amount of the development that took place
in the United States.

These issues raise concern on the practicality of a joint
venture under such a

5-2

scenario. Considering the relative immaturity of the current
American market and the long lead time necessary to design and
construct a system, private industry is unlikely to have the
incentive to develop the technology on its own. Intergovern-
mental cooperation will be necessary to help coordinate and
possibly fund the private sector whose internal priorities
would most likely supersede any national commitment.

At the same time, in view of the potential benefits of the
experience gained by potential joint venture foreign partners,
there would appear to be very little to lose in allowing joint
venture participants in a design competition, provided that a
substantial share of the development is guaranteed to take
place in the United States.

5.2.3 Development of a USML System

5.2.3.1 Background

Historically, the concept of maglev as a high-speed
transportation system has had strong support in the United
States and the recent responses of the private sector and
academia during the NMI program demonstrate both the interest
and capability to initiate a U.S.-designed system. It has been
demonstrated in previous sections of the report that a
U.S.-designed system would better serve the characteristics of
the U.S. market including such factors as:

. Greater distances between major cities.

. Widely variable climatic, topographical, seismic, and
geological conditions.

. Operational demands for airline-quality service.

. Consumers demanding higher levels of intercity service.

These characteristics, when translated into technical
requirements, could result in a U.S. concept that offers
distinct improvements over foreign technology.

5.2.3.2 USML Development Program

The typical approach to developing a new, advanced technology
transportation system relies on a multiphased program to
reduce technical risk and cost exposure. Any new technology
has risks associated with it. The development program should
be designed to systematically resolve those issues by first
assessing the technology state-of-the-art, evaluating
candidate system concept definitions (SCD) and determining
potential applications. This has already been accomplished
during the NMI study. Twenty-seven technology assessment
contracts have been completed along with four SCD studies.
The market and economic potential of maglev systems for
application in the United States has also been addressed.
These studies have shown that a USML system is technically
feasible and there are significant areas for technical
improvements compared to competing systems. The conclusion is
that the U.S. industry is ready to proceed with the initial
phase of a maglev system prototype development program.

This type of development program would be conducted in three
phases and would provide sufficient competition to ensure the
best designs are generated and the best design teams are
selected. The program duration would be selected to maximize
the development of innovative ideas while keeping the
technical and cost risks at a reasonable level. At the same
time,

5-3

periodic program reviews would be built into the program,
allowing for reevaluations of the benefits and costs of the
program based on the latest technical and economic
information. As already noted, participation of foreign firms
in collaboration with U.S. partners should not be discouraged,
provided that a substantial share of the development is
guaranteed to take place in the United States. This
development option would permit the maglev system to meet the
U.S.-unique transportation and service requirements, thus
maximizing the major factor in indicating acceptance by the
traveling public. An aggressive schedule to achieve these
goals would have the prototype under operational test in about
8 years at a technology demonstration test site.

5.3 EVALUATION/RATING OF THE THREE MAGLEV OPTIONS

In order to provide a consistent evaluation of the three
options on how to proceed with maglev, the following criteria
were established:

. Development Cost: The cost of developing the technology.

. System Performance: The ability to provide competitive trip
times in a variety of ROW conditions and with flexible service
patterns.

. Economic Performance: The ability to cover costs from revenues
and generate public benefits.

. U.S. Industry Competitiveness: The contribution to U.S.
industry's expertise in high technology enterprises.

. U.S. Jobs: The creation of skilled jobs within the United
States.

Each option is provided a qualitative rating for each
criterion, ranging from an H rating (high) which says the
option satisfies the criterion, an L rating (low) which says
the option poorly satisfies the criterion, and an M rating
(medium) for somewhere in between.

. Development Cost: While reliance on existing foreign
technology would not totally eliminate the cost of development
(some cost is necessary to adapt a foreign system to the U.S.
environment), Option 1 is certainly the best in this regard
and would be given an H rating. A USML development program
could cost around $800 million and is given an L rating.
Option 2, the joint venture, is somewhere in between with an
M rating.

. System Performance: The capability to follow existing ROW and
difficult topography without severe time penalties, to serve
off-line stations, and to provide the shortest trip times
while maintaining passenger comfort, points to the USML
getting an H rating since it can be optimized for these
characteristics. A joint venture would get an M rating, the
exact rating level depending on the amount of development.
Option 1 gets an L rating.

. Economic Performance: As discussed in the previous section, a
U.S. system out performs existing maglev technology,
particularly in the most important markets. On this basis it

5-4

receives an H while existing technology gets an L and the
joint venture an M.

. U.S. Industry Developing U.S. industry high technology
engineering expertise is accomplished best by having U.S.
industry design and build their own system, giving an H rating
for Option 3. Neither buying foreign technology nor a joint
venture will achieve a meaningful capability in U.S. industry
in an acceptable time period, although a joint venture would
be marginally better than buying foreign technology, thus a
rating of L for buying foreign and M for a joint venture.

. U.S. Jobs: Implementing a maglev system in the United States
would mean essentially the same infrastructure construction
jobs for each option, assuming the system is built in the same
corridors under each option. That is, since the construction
has to be done in the United States, a reasonable assumption
is that the construction work would be done by U.S. companies.
These jobs are mostly in the "blue collar" category. Since
the USML provides superior economic performance, it could
result in a more extensive system being built and, hence, more
jobs in a less than full employment economy. The remaining
jobs are the high technology, research and development, and
design engineering jobs using engineers and technicians.
Again, since the USML would have the most U.S. jobs, an H
rating, with buying foreign having the least, an L rating, and
the joint venture with only a limited number of these jobs,
an M rating.

Table 5.1 summarizes the comparison of maglev options. To
obtain the performance optimized for the U.S. transportation
needs and to protect U.S. competitiveness and develop U.S.
capability in this advanced technology area, the U.S. designed
maglev has the clear advantage. The issue of development cost
must be evaluated in terms of maintaining the U.S. industry as
a player in the international competition for advanced
technology and from the standpoint of what the relative costs
and benefits are among the options. The higher profit and
lower funding requirement on the NEC corridor of USML relative
to TR07 add up to more than enough to offset the development
cost. The USML has lower public funding requirements and a
higher.

5-5

revenue-to-cost ratio than TR07 in the remaining corridors
studied. Table 5.1 shows that the USML development program is
the proper choice among these options.

5-6

Chapter 6: Conclusions and Recommendations

6.1 CONCLUSIONS

This study has examined magnetic levitation technology to
determine its potential in terms of how it would perform and
compete with existing and future transportation options for
application in the United States in the early twenty-first
century, and how the Federal Government should be involved to
assist in achieving that potential. The study assessed U.S.
industry's capability to design and build a competitive maglev
system and compared the performance of such a system with that
of existing maglev (German Transrapid TR07) and of high-speed
rail (such as French TGV) as alternatives, in competition with
existing air, highway, and conventional rail.

6.1.1 U.S. Industry Can Develop an Advanced Maglev System

Maglev is a technically feasible alternative transportation
system. There were no technical impediments identified and the
safety and environmental issues can be satisfactorily
addressed within the context of a suitable development
program.

The Transrapid TR07 Maglev is a preproduction prototype system
undergoing final acceptance testing in Germany for possible
application in the Orlando, Florida area. Based on a
comprehensive analysis of that system, the conclusion is that
maglev has been demonstrated as a technically feasible
transportation system. This is supported by the status of the
Japanese MLU002 prototype system under development in Japan.
Although not as far along as the German TR07, the Japanese
maglev has also demonstrated technical feasibility. Since
these systems have not been operated in revenue service, the
public's reaction to them has not been determined. Generally,
individuals who have taken rides on the TR07 have reacted
favorably.

The NMI study concluded that U.S. industry can develop a
maglev system that has specific performance improvements over
the German and Japanese maglev systems. This evaluation is
based on the collective data from the technology assessment
and system concept definition contracts. Several design
improvements could result in significant performance and
economic benefits compared to the other high-speed ground
alternatives. For example, tilting mechanisms and high
powered, efficient propulsion systems will allow USML vehicles
to follow existing right(s)-of-way (ROW) at speeds
substantially higher than the German and Japanese maglev
systems. New composite materials and innovative vehicle and
component designs can be used to reduce the weight of maglev
vehicles and improve energy consumption. Although none of
these improvements are considered to "leap frog" the existing
maglev designs, taken together, they represent a significant
opportunity for U.S. industry to participate in the maglev
competition. These improvements were translated into
performance terms to evaluate a U.S. design in the market and
economic studies. Cost estimates were also developed for the
U.S. design maglev system and used in the economic studies. It
should be pointed out that the estimated costs for TGV are
supported by significant operational

6-1

experience in France and for TR07, significant test experience
in Germany. For USML, the cost estimates were derived from
analytical studies by 4 system contractor teams and are
considered reasonable, yet, until a U.S. maglev system is
built and operated in the United States, there is uncertainty
regarding these estimates.

In addition to the issue of opportunities for a U.S. design,
there is the related issue of how to acquire the improved
technology- that is, buy a foreign system or design and build
one in the United States. One approach is a U.S. and foreign
industry partnership to implement a foreign maglev design in
the United States. The maglev system design in this case is
assumed to require modification to optimize it for U.S.
application. The cost for this development work could be
shared with the U.S. and foreign industry partners, but, from
a practical standpoint, the foreign industry will not likely
spend additional development funds unless there is an assured
market with a reasonable return time period. Modifications to
an existing design are best made by the personnel that did the
original design; hence, there will be little opportunity for
U.S. industry to benefit in the high technology job areas.

Although joint ventures are a possibility, they work much
better when both sides have some equivalent experience or
capability to bring to the table. For example, with the German
Transrapid design being so far along, the primary expertise
the United States brings to the table is knowledge of local
U.S. transportation construction issues. The high technology
benefit to the U.S. industry will be limited, with a
relatively long time to realize any significant benefit.

6.1.2 A USML System Has the Potential for Revenues to Exceed
Life Cycle Costs in One Corridor, and to Cover Operating
Costs and a Substantial Portion of Capital Costs in
Others

If a USML system with the characteristics shown in this report
were installed in the 10 top U.S. corridor markets, its
revenues would cover operating costs, with substantial
contribution to capital costs in all corridors. In the
Northeast Corridor, its revenues would cover total life cycle
costs. In the other corridors significant public investment
would be required. These projected results reflect the ability
of the technology to offer the best door-to-door travel time
for distances up to 300 miles and very competitive trip times
even up to 600 miles. They also, however, reflect the high
cost of building such systems, $27 million to $46 million per
mile, including site preparation and other costs that depend
on terrain, degree of urbanization, and other factors.

The detailed economic results depend on the discount rate used
in the calculations. A 7 percent discount rate with constant
dollar prices was used as the baseline rate for this report.
When translated into market terms (where inflation is taken
into account), it would be about 10 to 11 percent. This is the
rate required to be used by the Office of Management and
Budget for making economic decisions regarding all Federal
Government sponsored or assisted projects. It is intended to
reflect the average return to capital investments in all
sectors of the economy and, thus, the social opportunity cost
of using resources for maglev investments. With a 7 percent
rate USML revenues would be slightly higher than life cycle
costs in the Northeast

6-2

Corridor, but would cover only about 30 to 50 percent of life
cycle costs in the other nine corridors. Under more favorable
assumptions about future travel growth, congestion, and cost
of competing modes, two of the corridors would cover life
cycle costs and the others would cover about 50 to 80 percent.

A 4 percent discount rate was also used for the same
calculations as a sensitivity analysis. When translated into
market terms, this is representative of the type of financing
that could be available to sponsors of high-speed ground
transportation projects under the Administration's
recommendation to exempt HSR bond interest from income taxes
without annual limits. In this case, in the Northeast
Corridor, a U.S. Maglev system would produce a surplus of
revenues about 47 percent above life cycle costs. In the other
nine corridors, revenues would cover about 50 to 80 percent of
the life cycle costs. Under the more favorable assumptions,
six corridors would cover total costs, with the other three
covering about 75 percent.

Generally, revenue-to-cost ratios would be higher for USML
versus both TR07 and TGV at both discount rates; however,
outside the Northeast Corridor, where revenues are less than
life cycle costs, USML would require higher public investment
than TGV, though lower than for TR07. In the Northeast
Corridor, the revenue-to-cost ratio for USML would be about
the same as for TGV at the 7 percent discount rate, but higher
than for TR07, while at the 4 percent rate it would be higher
than for both TGV and TR07. The advantages for USML are more
pronounced when it is compared to other systems using existing
ROW, because of the superior ability of USML to operate on
curves at high speed.

USML produces public benefits of reduced environmental
pollution, petroleum consumption, and congestion at airports
because of its ridership diversion from highways and air
systems. Generally, these public benefits are also larger for
the USML than for TR07 or TGV because of its comparative
attractiveness as an alternative to air and auto travel.

This analysis supports the conclusion that USML can be
considered as a potentially effective intercity passenger
transportation alternative for the twenty-first century in
high-density corridors.

6.1.3 A USML System Would Provide an Opportunity to Develop new
Technologies and Industries with Possible Benefits for
U.S. Businesses and the Work Force

U.S. industry competitiveness benefits are significant with a
USML development program. The generation of high technology
jobs would be greater for designing and implementing a U.S.
system as opposed to buying a foreign system. However, the
U.S. system development costs would be considerably more than
the costs associated with bringing in the foreign system; yet,
if comparable performance were required of the foreign maglev
system to meet the level of the U.S. design, significant
developmental costs would also be required for the foreign
system. With the development of a U.S. maglev system, domestic
industry would also gain through high technology businesses
capitalizing on spin-offs that will occur as maglev technology
evolves. Examples that offer particular economic

6-3

value could be the early implementation of fiber reinforced
polymers in concrete structures, vibration insensitive
superconducting magnets, and ruggedized cryogenic systems for
ship propulsion and other uses.

6.1.4 A U.S. Maglev is not Likely to be Developed Without
Significant Federal Government Investment

The U.S. industry is not likely to fund a significant amount
of the development of a maglev prototype. Maglev has both
technical and financial risks associated with it. The fact
that the ultimate payback to the private investors is very
long term and that there are risks makes it unlikely that the
private sector will fund the development costs. The major
development costs will be associated with the vehicle/guideway
interaction and propulsion/levitation/guidance and control
issues. These are not associated with the area where the most
implementation costs reside, namely guideway construction. The
industry partners involved in the most intricate development
activity will not be the ones with the largest potential
return. The likelihood of industry supporting significant cost
sharing is very low, particularly as the cost exposure
escalates in the later phases of a development program.

In conclusion, development is unlikely to move forward at all
unless the U.S. Government funds the major portion of the
development costs. If maglev were implemented, the ultimate
sponsors, i.e., the state and local governments, would be
expected to share in the construction costs because they would
be the ones to ultimately benefit and the pay-back period would
be much reduced relative to the development time frame.

6.2 RECOMMENDATIONS

The NMI study team recommends that the Federal Government
should initiate Phase I (Conceptual Design) of a USML
Prototype Development Program. The Federal Government should
fund the majority of the development since industry will not
fund a significant amount of it. The recommended program
differs in its implementation from that defined in the ISTEA
legislation. Because of the mixed results of some of the
economic analysis and uncertainties about the cost and
performance of a U.S. maglev system compared to other
high-speed ground transportation alternatives, several program
reviews should be built into the program allowing for
reevaluations of the benefits and costs of the program based
on the latest technical and economic information. The first
such review should be at the end of 1994, based in part on
information available from the study of the commercial
feasibility of high-speed ground transportation mandated under
ISTEA.

The entire program would be a three phased development plan
leading to a technical demonstration at a test site. A program
option for a revenue service demonstration should be retained
during the development program, subject to a determination
that all technical risks are adequately understood and
mitigated, that the design is mature enough, and that the net
benefits are great enough to warrant such a step. The
requirements of the ISTEA should be modified to reflect this

6-4

approach and incorporate a modified development schedule to
assure reasonable technical and cost risks.

This recommendation is based on the conclusions from the NMI
study and from recognition of the future need to address
expected and unexpected issues of airport and highway
congestion, petroleum dependence, and environmental
(pollution) restrictions. To respond to those issues, action
is required now to have a transportation option available in
the next 15 to 20 years. The United States must also maintain
its capability to compete in the advanced technology market. A
USML system is a step toward achieving an improved position in
the ground transportation field.

6.3 RECOMMENDED PROGRAM

The recommended program as illustrated in Figure 6.1 would
require a transition period from the NMI program and would be
executed in three phases:

Phase 1-Concept Exploration/ System Concept Design

Phase 2-Demonstration/Validation/ System Detailed Design

Phase 3-Full Scale Fabrication/ Construction and Test

Click HERE for graphic.

6-5

Concept Exploration will feature full and open competition
with multiple entrants, a down selection to two system
concepts in Demonstration and Validation, and a final down
selection to a single concept for Full-Scale Development.
Key decision points at the end of 1994 and at the end of each
phase will allow the Government to examine the need to
continue the program prior to committing additional funds.

Concurrent with the development work performed by contractor
teams, site selection, and environmental assessments for a
test track located at a Government facility and possibly at a
demonstration track located in a revenue corridor will be
scheduled to preserve the option to complete full-scale
development at the demonstration site if remaining risks are
sufficiently low.

Compared to ISTEA the principal changes called for in the
recommended program are:

. An additional 24 months of development time to reduce
technical risk by allowing extended testing, particularly
for system features which have not yet been demonstrated in
any maglev system, such as tilt.

. Placement of the test track at a Government facility to
allow less restrictive and more complete testing, including
testing outside the typical design parameters of the system.

. Clarifying the ability of the competitors in the program to
employ elements of foreign technology as long as a substantial
share of the development program takes place in the United
States.

The changes are based on the conclusion that the tight
schedule called for by ISTEA would not provide sufficient time
for development of technological advancements and testing of
the U.S. designed maglev system in order to ensure that safety,
reliability, and maintainability standards are achieved. Of
specific concern is the inability for testing the maglev
system under "worst case" scenarios that would be
inappropriate on a revenue corridor, i.e., high-speed runs,
endurance testing, emergency egress, and weather effects
testing. Because of these needs, it would be desirable to test
the system at a test track prior to fielding the system at a
revenue site.

6-6

APPENDIX A
ADDITIONAL
INFORMATION

Appendix A: Additional Information

Guideway Cost Estimates

The Government Maglev System Assessment (GMSA) team developed
guideway cost estimates for the TR07 and each of the four SCD
concepts. This was necessary because the cost estimating
approach varied widely from one SCD contractor to another;
variances resulted from different guideway heights, different
unit prices for similar commodities, non-uniform allocation of
components into subsystems, missing items, and differences in
the application of contingencies, overhead, and profit
factors.

The GMSA team, therefore, reworked the contractors' cost
estimates in order to compare the different technologies on an
equivalent basis. First, a standard method was applied to
allocate components into subsystems, then the unit costs were
developed for each subsystem, and finally the estimates were
compared, based upon a common set of parameters such as
guideway height. In the case of the TRO7, the GMSA team's
estimate was derived from the California-Nevada proposal by
Transrapid International/Bechtel.

The cost of the USML was developed by examining the subsystem
costs for each SCD concept, deleting the costs that were
substantially too high or too low (based on engineering
judgment), and averaging the remaining costs. This is
justified by the fact that each contractor optimized the
design of different subsystems, and that some high unit costs
resulted from innovations that more conventional approaches
with lower cost solutions could avoid. For example, one
contractor proposed the use of a LCLSM, which the Government
team priced at a very high unit cost, while another concept
required a very large amount of aluminum in the guideway
structure. Both of these extremes were deleted from the
average costs of subsystems for USML.

APPENDIX B

LIST OF
NMI PARTICIPANTS

Appendix B: List of NMI Participants

Government Agencies

Argonne National Labs, Argonne, IL
Brookhaven National Labs, Upton, NY
National Academy of Science, Transportation Research Board,
Washington, D.C.
National Maglev Initiative Program Office, Washington, D.C.
National Aeronautics and Space Administration, Langley,
Hampton, VA
National Aeronautics and Space Administration, Ames, Mountain
View, CA
New York State Department of Transportation, Albany, NY
State of California, CALTRANS, San Francisco, CA
U.S. Army Corps of Engineers/CEHND, Huntsville, AL
U.S. Army Corps of Engineers/CRREL, Hanover, NH
U.S. Army Corps of Engineers/WES, Vicksburg, MS
U.S. Army Corps of Engineers, Washington, D.C.
U.S. Army, Office of the Assistant Secretary (Civil Works),
Washington, D.C.
U.S. Department of Energy, Washington, D.C.
U.S. Department of Transportation, Federal Aviation
Administration, Washington, D.C.
U.S. Department of Transportation, Federal Highway
Administration, Washington, D.C.
U.S. Department of Transportation, Federal Railroad
Administration, Washington, D.C.
U.S. Department of Transportation, Research and Special
Programs Administration, Washington D.C.
U.S. Department of Transportation, Federal Transit
Administration, Washington, D.C.
U.S. Department of Transportation, Office of the Secretary,
Washington, D.C.
U.S. Department of Transportation, Volpe National
Transportation System Center, Cambridge, MA
U.S. Environmental Protection Agency, Washington, D.C.

Industry

American Superconductor Corp., Watertown, MA
Arthur D. Little, Cambridge, MA
Babcock & Wilcox, Lynchburg, Va and Houston, TX
Battelle, Columbus, OH
Bechtel, San Francisco, CA
Beech Aircraft, Wichita, KA
Berger/ABAM Engineers, Federal Way, WA
Boeing, Seattle, WA
Bombardier, Boucherville, Quebec, Canada
Bromwell & Carrier, Lakeland, FL
Charles River Associates, Boston, MA
Charles Stark Draper Labs, Cambridge, MA
Council on Superconductivity for American Competitiveness,
Washington, D.C.
DeLeuw Cather & Company, New York, NY

B-1

Industry (Cont'd)

EA Mueller, Arlington, VA
EG&G Dynatrend Inc., Transportation Division, Burlington, MA
EG&G Dynatrend Inc., Technologies Integration Group,
Arlington, VA
EG&G Washington Analytical Services Center, Inc., Rockville, MD
Electric Research and Management, State College, PA
ENSCO, Inc., Springfield, VA
FAI, Inc., Vienna, VA
Failure Analysis Associates, Menlo Park, CA
Foster-Miller, Waltham, MA
General Atomics, San Diego, CA
General Dynamics, Arlington, VA
General Electric Company, Schenectady, NY
General Motors, Electro-Motors Division, Washington, D.C.
Gibbs & Hill, Inc., New York, NY
Grumman Aerospace Corp., Bethpage, NY
Harris, Miller/Miller Hansen, Inc., Lexington, MA
Honeywell, Minneapolis, MN
Hudson Engineering Corporation, Houston, TX
Hughes Ground Systems Group, Fullerton, CA
Intermagnetics General, Guilderland, NY
Kaman Science, Santa Monica, CA
Lockheed Corp, Calabasas, CA
Louis Berger & Associates, Inc., Waltham, MA
Madison, Madison International, Detroit, MI
Magneplane International, Bedford, MA
Martin Marietta Information Systems Group, Washington, D.C.
Martin Marietta, Denver, CO
Morrison-Knudsen Corp., Washington, D.C.
Parsons Binkerhoff, Quade & Douglas, Inc., Herndon, VA,
Atlanta, GA, and Boston, MA
PSM Technologies, Pittsburgh, PA
Process Systems International, Westborough, MA
Raytheon Co./Equipment Division, Marlborough, MA
United Engineers and Constructors, Technical Services, Boston,
MA
U.S. Travel Data Center, Washington, DC

Academic Institutions

Aeronautical & Astronautical Research Laboratory, Ohio State
University, Cleveland, OH
Canadian Institute of Guided Ground Transportation, Queens
University, Kingston, Ontario, Canada
Cornell University, Ithaca, NY
Massachusetts Institute of Technology/Mechanical Engineering,
Cambridge, MA
MIT Center for Transportation, Cambridge, MA
MIT Lincoln Laboratory, Cambridge, MA

B-2

Academic Institutions (Cont'd)

MIT Plasma Fusion Center, Cambridge, MA
Northwestern University, Evanston, IL
Texas A&M University, College Station, TX
State University of New York, Albany, NY
University of Washington, Seattle, WA
West Virginia University, Morgantown, WV

B-3

BIBLIOGRAPHY

Bibliography

Johnson, L. R., D. M. Rote, J. R. Hull, H. T. Coffey, J. G.
Daley, and R. F. Geise, Maglev Vehicles and Superconducting
Technology Integration of High Speed Ground Transportation into
the Air Travel System, Center for Transportation Research,
Energy and Environmental Systems Division, Argonne National
Laboratory, April 1989

The Maglev Technology Advisory Committee Reporting to the
United States Senate Committee on Environment and Public Works,
Benefits of Magnetically Levitated High Speed Transportation
for the United States, Volume 1 Executive Report, June 1989,
Grumman Corporation, Bethpage, NY 11714 3580

National Research Council (U.S.) Transportation Research Board,
In Pursuit of Speed: New Options for Intercity Passenger
Transport, (Special Report 233), 1991

U.S. Army Corps of Engineers, Preliminary Implementation Plan,
National Maglev Initiative, A Public Private Program, June 1990

U.S. Congress, Office of Technology Assessment, New Ways:
Tiltrotor Aircraft & Magnetically Levitated Vehicles. OTA SET
507 (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office, October
1991)

U.S. Department of Transportation/Federal Railroad
Administration Report to Congress, Assessment of the Potential
for Magnetic Levitation Transportation Systems in the United
States, Moving America, New Directions, New Opportunities, June
1990

U.S. Department of Transportation, Federal Railroad
Administration; U.S. Army Corps of Engineers; U.S. Department
of Energy, National Maglev Initiative Annual Report November
1991, Moving America, New Directions, New Opportunities

BB-1

Glossary

BAA Broad Agency Announcement. A notice from the
Government that requests scientific or
research proposals from private firms
concerning certain areas of interest to the
Government. The proposals submitted by
private firms may lead to contracts.

bogie A railroad car or locomotive undercarriage.

commutate Reverse the direction of an alternating current
each half cycle to yield a unidirectional
current.

consist The composition (number and specific identity)
of individual units of a train.

cryogenics The science of low temperature phenomena.

cryostat A device for maintaining constant low
temperature.

DOE Department of Energy.

DOT Department of Transportation.

EDS electrodynamic suspension.

EMS electromagnetic Suspension.

Emsland Test site of the TR07 in Germany.

ES Extensive sharing of right of way.

externalities public benefits.

FHWA Federal Highway Administration.

fiber A polymer based alternative to ferrous
reinforcement of concrete and reinforced other materials.
plastic

FRA Federal Railroad Administration.

FRP Fiber Reinforced Plastic.

FY Fiscal Year.

G-1

GMSA Government Maglev System Assessment.

guideway A riding surface (including support structure)
that physically guides vehicles specially
designed to travel on it.

H-bridge A four arm, alternating current bridge, the
balance of which varies with electrical
frequency.

headway The interval between the passing of the front
ends of successive vehicles moving in the same
direction along the same lane, track, or other
guideway.

HSGT High Speed Ground Transportation.

HSR High Speed Rail.

HSST High Speed Surface Transportation.

ICE Intercity Express.

Intermodal Unified, interconnected forms of transportation.

inventor An electrical circuit device which reverses an
input to an opposite output in terms of some
electrical characteristics such as polarity,
voltage, or frequency.

ISTEA Intermodal Surface Transportation Efficiency Act.

IVHS Intelligent Vehicle/Highway Systems.

LCLSM locally commutated linear synchronous motor.

levitating To rise or cause to rise into air and float in
apparent defiance of gravity.

levitation, Support technology that keeps a vehicle
magnetic separated from its guideway by riding a surface
of magnetic force.

life cycle The useful or total productive time span of an
asset or system.

life cycle The present value total cost for acquisition and
operation over the cost useful life of an asset
or system.

LIM linear induction motor.

G-2

linehaul Transportation service time between points
time without consideration of external time factors
such as access to the system or entry and exit
requirements.

long stator Propulsion using an electrically powered linear
motor winding in the guideway.

LS Limited sharing of rights of way.

LSM linear synchronous motor.

maglev magnetic levitation.

magnetic Support technology that keeps a vehicle
levitation separated from its guideway by riding a surface
of magnetic force.

MLU A Japanese maglev system employing a U shaped
guideway.

MN Mainly new right of way.

NMI National Maglev Initiative.

NITS National Intermodal Transportation System.

O&M Operation and maintenance.

OD Origin destination.

pantograph A device for collecting current from an overhead
conductor, characterized by a hinged vertical
arm operating by springs or compressed air and a
wide, horizontal contact surface that glides
along the wire.

PMT Passenger Miles Traveled.

PSE The Paris Lyon Route on which the TGV has been
in service since 1981 in France.

right of way A general term denoting land, property, or
interest therein, usually in a strip, acquired
for or devoted to transportation purposes.

ROW Right(s) of way.

RTRI Railway Technical Research Institute, the
research section of the newly privatized Japan
Rail Group.

G-3

SCD system concept definition.

Shinkansen Japanese "bullet train".

short stator Propulsion technology using a linear induction
motor winding onboard the vehicle and a passive
guideway.

spline Any of a series of projections on a shaft that
fit into slots on acorresponding shaft.

stator The nonrotating part of the magnetic structure in
an induction motor.

supercon- The abrupt and total disappearance of resistance
ductivity to direct current which occurs in some materials
at temperatures near to or somewhat above
absolute zero (like 90 K for some high
temperature superconductors).

TGV Train a Grande Vitesse.

Train a The French National Railway’s high speed, steel
Grande wheel on rail train.
Vitesse

Transrapid The German high speed maglev system. This system
is nearest to (TR07) commercial readiness.

USACE United States Army Corps of Engineers.

USML United States Maglev.

WES Waterways Experimental Station, U.S. Army Corps
of Engineers.

G-4

(TNM.html)
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Calling All Thunder Lizards

2007-10-07T06:22:00.000-07:00

Hello, this is Silverbeard. I am appealing for help building a community of high IQ data junkies. Tracking down all the various egg-head subjects in the world is a daunting task. And then, arranging the information in an illuminating manner for those that feel the accelerated need for knowledge.

The post below outlines the tasks involved in building a brain trust community. So, I'm calling on a few special someones to:

Find the breakthrough ideas, the unique thinkers, the creative minds of our century and post the info in this blog. Or, Join my WIKI TIKI for even more flexibility, control, and extended ability for expression.

Or, add video to our video site for the highly inquisitive -- "Silverbeard Arcadia's Video Channel".

Take us on a voyage of discovery! Show us what you know! Contribute to a new, creative, and dynamic community! Calling all thunder lizards! Show us something culturally significant.

Disseminating important information converts knowledge into wisdom. If you can help this process, we can find a way to improve our lives and our neighbors lives.

Silverbeard's Arcadia HOME page

2007-10-07T06:15:00.001-07:00

The Art of Creating a Community: How to Guide

I admit it: I’m a user-group junkie. I got my first taste of user groups when I worked for Apple—speaking at their meetings was one of my great pleasures. Their members were unpaid, raging, inexorable thunderlizard evangelists for Macintosh and Apple II.

These folks sustained Apple by supporting its customers when Apple couldn’t—or didn’t want to—support them itself. Now that Apple is the homecoming queen again, there are lots of people receiving, taking, and claiming credit for its success. The Apple user-group community deserves a high-five tribute too.

Now that I gotten that off my chest; I can move on to the topic of this entry: how to create a kick-ass community. I anticipate many comments to this entry, so I am warning you in advance that I am going to modify and supplement this entry frequently. RSS readers beware! :-)

Create something worth building a community around. This is a repeated theme in my writing: the key to evangelism, sales, demoing, and building a community is a great product. Frankly, if you create a great product, you may not be able to stop a community from forming even if you tried. By contrast, it’s hard to build a community around mundane and mediocre crap no matter how hard you try.

Identify and recruit your thunderlizards—immediately! Most companies are stupid: they go for months and then are surprised: “Never heard of them. You mean there are groups of people forming around our products?” If you have a great product, then pro-act: find the thunderlizards and ask them to build a community. (Indeed, if you cannot find self-appointed evangelists for your product, you may not have created a great product.) If it is a great product, however, just the act of asking these customers to help you is so astoundingly flattering that they’ll help you.

Assign one person the task of building a community. Sure, many employees would like to build a community, but who wakes up every day with this task at the top of her list of priorities? Another way to look at this is, “Who’s going to get fired if she doesn’t build a community?” A community needs a champion—an identifiable hero and inspiration—from within the company to carry the flag for the community. Therefore, hire one less MBA and allocate this headcount to a community champion. This is a twofer: one less MBA and one great community.

Give people something concrete to chew on. Communities can’t just sit around composing love letters to your CEO about how great she is. This means your product has to be “customizable,” “extensible,” and “malleable.” Think about Adobe Photoshop: if it weren’t for the company’s plug-in architecture, do you think its community would have developed so quickly? However, giving people something to chew on requires killing corporate hubris and admitting that your engineers did not create the perfect product. Nevertheless, the payoff is huge because once you get people chewing on a product, it’s hard to wrest it away from them.
Create an open system. There are two requirements of an open system first, a “SDK” (software development kit). This is software-weenie talk for documentation and tools to supplement a product; second, APIs (application programming interfaces). This is more software-weenie talk for an explanation of how to access the various functions of a product, and it’s typically part of a good SDK. I’m using software terminology here, but the point is that you need to provide people with the tools and information to tweak your product whether it is Photoshop, an iPod, or a Harley-Davidson. Here’s a non-tech example: An open system school would enable parents to teach courses and provide a manual (SDK) for parents to understand how to do so.

Welcome criticism. Most companies feel warm and fuzzy towards their communities as long as these communities toe the line by continuing to say nice things, buying their products, and never complaining. The minute that the community says anything negative, however, companies freak out and pull back their community efforts. This is a dumb-ass thing to do. A company cannot control its community. This is a long-term relationship, so the company shouldn’t file for divorce at the first sign of possible infidelity. Indeed, the more a company welcomes—even celebrates criticism—the stronger its bonds to its community.

Foster discourse. The definition of “discourse” is a verbal exchange. The key word here is “exchange.” Any company that fosters community building should also participate in the exchange of ideas and opinions. At the basic level of community building, your website should provide a forum where customers can engage in discourse with one another as well as with the company’s employees. At the bleeding edge of community building, your CEO participates in community events too. This doesn’t mean that you let the community run your company, but you should listen to what they have to say.

Publicize the existence of the community. If you’re going to all the trouble of catalyzing a community, don’t hide it under a bushel. Your community should be an integral part of your sales and marketing efforts. Check out, for instance, this part of the Harley-Davidson web site dedicated to the HOG (Harley Owners Group). If you search for “user group” (with quotes) at Apple’s site, you get 112 matches. (The same search at Microsoft’s site yields 16,925 matches—I’m still pondering what this means!)

Welcome to Silverbeard's Arcadian Chronicles

2007-10-05T14:48:00.000-07:00

The chronicles are about subjects that are deep. By that we mean, intellectually challenging for the budding polymath. Is it ego to understand the vastness of the sea of knowledge, and still want to take on the challenge of learning as much of it as possible? Or, is it just fun?

Find Our HOME page at "Silverbeard's Arcadia" -- News For the Highly Inquisitive

Or go to our VIDEO page at "Silverbeard's Arcadia Videos" -- Videos for the Highly Inquisitve

NeuroScience 101

2007-10-05T14:34:00.000-07:00

Get to know your brain. You can start by knowing the anatomy of the brain. If you know all the names and places and structures of the brain, you can then start to work out how they all interact. Hilarity ensues.

The joys of being a neuroscientist.

Join Our Guild of the Highly Inquisitive.